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ARTICLE
UNDERENFORCEMENT
Alexandra Natapoff*
INTRODUCTION

The United States' criminal system is infamous for its excesses: too
many laws, overcriminalization, and over-punishment. Our comprehensive
criminal codes, staggering incarceration rate, and their heavy impact on
communities of color have made charges of overenforcement pervasive. 1
As the "politics of crime" generates new offenses and ever harsher
punishments, 2 the United States puts more people in prison than any other

* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. This Article received Honorable
Mention in the 2007 AALS Scholarly Papers Competition. Many thanks to Bill Araiza, Eve
Brensike, Brietta Clark, Nestor Davidson, Sharon Dolovich, Rob Kar, Erik Luna, Eric
Miller, Dan Richman, David Sklansky, Bob Weisberg, Lauren Willis, and Ron Wright.
Thanks also to Rena Durrant for her research assistance. This work was supported by the
Loyola Faculty Research Fellowship Program.
1. The general concept of "overenforcement" includes a number of related phenomena,
including extensive criminal codes ("overcriminalization"); harsh punishments ("overpunishment"); and heavy-handed enforcement of a particular offense or against a particular
group ("overenforcement" or, sometimes, "selective enforcement"). See, e.g., James Q.
Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America
and Europe 4 (2003) (describing the United States as "in the midst of a national get-tough
movement," leaving us with a system "vastly harsher than in any other country to which the
United States would ordinarily be compared" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Richard
A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 Geo. L.J. 1743, 1744 n.2 (2005)
(surveying literature critical of overenforcement policies); see also id. at 1744-45
(distinguishing between overenforcement and over-deterrence); Erik Luna, The
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703, 710 (2005) (chronicling the
expansion of criminal liability and the national "punishment binge"); Dorothy E. Roberts,
CriminalJustice and Black Families: The CollateralDamage of Over-enforcement, 34 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1005, 1008 (2001) (criminalizing African Americans "serves a repressive
function"); William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
505 (2001) (arguing that broad codes overcriminalize behavior and expand law enforcement
power). See generally Invisible Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of Mass
Imprisonment (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter Invisible
Punishment] (documenting the social and economic harms of overpunishment).
2. See Symposium, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev.
541 (2005) (symposium issue devoted to overcriminalization); William Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 803 (2006) (describing the
"academic trend" that "blames democracy" for the increased harshness of substantive
criminal law).
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nation. Many scholars conclude that the criminal system occupies an
3
increasingly central role as a general governance mechanism.
Criticisms of the U.S. system often revolve around the insight that a
system as pervasive, harsh, and racially charged as ours requires serious
rethinking.
Indeed, much of the critical literature focuses on the
4
disproportionate weight of overenforcement on minority communities.
The overcriminalization and mass incarceration of so much of the black
male population has created a visible legal underclass, and has perpetuated
the destruction of families, economic opportunities, and other human
capital. 5 Overenforcement policies are also increasingly challenged as
normatively counterproductive; with their draconian overkill and racial
skew, they foster resentment and disrespect for the law among otherwise
law-abiding members of the community and reduce social incentives to
obey the law. 6 For some, the racial inequalities created by overenforcement
strike at the heart of the legitimacy of the entire system. In these ways,
"overenforcement" has become one of the central lenses through which the
racial imbalances, inegalitarianism, and other weaknesses of the criminal
7
justice system are viewed and understood.
By comparison, underenforcement has been given short shrift,
particularly in the area of street and violent crime. 8 A decade ago, Randall
Kennedy argued that "the principal injury suffered by African-Americans in
relation to criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of

3. See generally David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in
Contemporary Society (2001) (describing the trend toward social control through crime
policy and U.S. overreliance on criminal enforcement as a hallmark of modem governance);
Luna, supra note 1, at 718-19 (describing overcriminalization as "part of an alarming
readiness to apply the criminal justice system without limitation throughout the entirety of
American life"); Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in The Crime Conundrum:
Essays on Criminal Justice 171 (Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997).
4. See, e.g., David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal
Justice System (2005) [hereinafter Cole, No Equal Justice]; Invisible Punishment, supra note
1; David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New
CriminalJustice Scholarship,87 Geo. L.J. 1059 (1999); Roberts, supra note 1.
5. See Invisible Punishment, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Children, Cops, and Citizenship. Why Conservatives
Should Oppose Racial Profiling, in Invisible Punishment, supra note 1, at 150 (arguing that
racial profiling and other punitive enforcement policies encourage inner-city youth to
disregard authority); see also Cole, No Equal Justice, supra note 4, at 3-4; Roberts, supra
note 1.
7. There are, of course, other systemic criticisms that focus on different values and
concerns. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First
Principles 154 (1997) (questioning legitimacy and efficacy of criminal procedure doctrines);
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participationin CriminalProcedure,81 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
911 (2006) (criticizing victims' and the general public's lack of information and access to
the criminal system).
8. It has long been suggested that white-collar and environmental crimes are
underenforced and under-punished. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate
Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295 (2001); Tom
Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 247,
292 (1997).
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the laws." 9 More recently, a few scholars-notably William Stuntz-have
suggested that underenforcement poses larger fairness problems than is
usually acknowledged. 10 Nevertheless, while Kennedy's contention is
widely cited, scholarly concerns with systemic unfairness still tend to
revolve around the criminal system's harshness and overextensions, not its
laxity.
Undercnforcement deserves a more central role in the evaluation of the
evenhandedness and democratic legitimacy of the criminal system.
Underenforcement is a weak state response to lawbreaking as well as to
victimization. It thus offers important insights into the government's
relationship with vulnerable groups in the context of the criminal system.
In practice, underenforcement is often linked with official discrimination,
increased violence, legal failure, and the undemocratic treatment of the
poor. Underenforcement can also be a form of deprivation, tracking
familiar categories of race, gender, class, and political powerlessness. 1'
Conceived of as a form of public policy, underenforcement is a crucial
distribution mechanism whereby the social good of lawfulness can be
withheld. 12
Underenforcement is far from abstract:
It embodies concrete
relationships and experiences, often of violence or insecurity. Within
certain communities or institutions-what I will call "underenforcement
zones"-the state routinely and predictably fails to enforce the law to the
detriment of vulnerable residents. Police concede that they will not arrest
certain sorts of perpetrators; many victims expect that they will remain
unprotected; and violators rest secure in the knowledge that their crimes are
the sort that will go unpunished. This type of underenforcement deprives

9. Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law 19 (1997).
10. William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing 3-4 (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No.
130, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=886170 ("Most
American cities are seriously underpoliced .... That fact may contribute to America's
enormous prison population: less policing is correlated with more punishment .... If the
social science literature on American crime rates is to be believed, less policing also means
more crime. And it may well mean more police violence, as understaffed police forces
compensate for their small numbers with a more intimidating style of law enforcement.").
11. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1394 (1988) (conceptualizing McCleskey "as an
instance of racial inequality in the provision of public goods," i.e., the denial of capital
punishment for the murder of black victims); David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy,
103 Mich. L. Rev. 1699, 1821 (2005) (noting that "policing is among other things a 'form of
redistribution"' (quoting Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?)Demise
of Criminal ProcedureLiberalism, 107 Yale L.J. 2281, 2315-17 (1998))); see also Barry
Goetz, Organizationas Class Bias in Local Law Enforcement: Arson-for-Profit as a "Non
Issue," 31 Law & Soc'y Rev. 557, 560 (1997) (describing white-collar crime literature that
identifies class bias in the allocation of law enforcement resources). But see Stuntz, supra
note 2, at 808 (arguing that policing is redistributive in that it redistributes tax dollars from
rich, low-crime areas to poorer, high-crime areas).
12. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is CapitalPunishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 707, 720-21 (2005) (arguing
that the state's failure to prevent crime should be treated affirmatively as a public policy).
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residents of personal and economic security, rendering calls to the police
futile or even dangerous and victimhood a routine fact of life. For residents
of these zones, lawfulness is spread unevenly throughout daily life and the
legal system is at best unpredictable.
In these underenforcement zones, the exercise of law enforcement
discretion is a bellwether of official responsiveness with implications for
the democratic legitimacy of the legal system. As Stuntz points out,
"Scholars do not ordinarily think of underpolicing as a failure of political
accountability. But it is ....-13 When law enforcement fails to answer
constituent needs, it devalues the security, property, and dignitary interests
of those the law purportedly protects. More formally, such failure weakens
the rule of law in those areas by neglecting the enforcement of existing
legal rules. By failing to maintain an atmosphere of legality, law
enforcement turns its back on victim classes twice: first, by denying them
material protective resources, and second, by depriving them of a robust,
responsive legal system.
The study of underenforcement thus supplements the increasingly
accepted criticism that our criminal system is too punitive, too intrusive,
and too enforcement-oriented. 14 These issues are typically juxtaposed as a
conundrum, particularly in poor, high-crime communities of color: How
can a community be simultaneously over-policed and under-policed?
Scholars struggling with this apparent contradiction often resolve it by
splitting communities into distinct "criminal" and "victim" classes, with
overenforcement aimed primarily at the former while underenforcement is
seen as a harm suffered by the latter, law-abiding residents. 15

13. Stuntz, supra note 10, at 13-14. "[T]he failure [to address underenforcement] is
more serious than most of the legal issues scholars debate, partly because underpolicing
makes all other regulatory problems worse." Id. at 14.
14. Am. Bar Ass'n, Justice Kennedy Comm'n, Reports with Recommendations to the
ABA House of Delegates 2-3 (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter Kennedy Commission Report],
available
at
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR209800/newsletterpubs/JusticeKenne
dyCommissionReportsFinal_081104.pdf (responding to Justice Kennedy's description of
aspects of the U.S. criminal system as overly harsh, racially imbalanced, "unwise and
unjust"); see also Whitman, supranote 1,at 4.
15. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, Cassia Spohn & Miriam DeLone, The Color of Justice:
Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America 94 (2000) ("Complaints about overpolicing or
harassment are usually voiced by young men who are most likely to be stopped.., and
arrested on the street. Complaints of too little policing, on the other hand, are expressed by
adults, especially those with families, who are worried about crime."); Tracey L. Meares &
Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v.
Morales, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 197, 210 ("'[R]esidents who express their concern and anger
over [crime] ...recognize that putting up gates around the entire neighborhood would not
rid [it] of the problems [that residents] are cxperiencing because the troublemakers are
natives."' (quoting Mary Patillo, Sweet Mothers and Gangbangers: Managing Crime in a
Black Middle-Class Neighborhood, 76 Social Forces 747 (1998))); cf Bernard E. Harcourt,
Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing 16-17, 135 (2001)
(criticizing order-maintenance policing as "grounded in these categorical distinctions"
between "honest people and.., the disorderly").
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But understanding underenforcement in its own right as a potential site
for distributive and democratic failure reveals that underenforcement is not
necessarily an alternative to overenforcement but often its corollary. Overand underenforcement are twin symptoms of a deeper democratic weakness
of the criminal system: its non-responsiveness to the needs of the poor,
racial minorities, and the otherwise politically vulnerable. 16 Because of this
weakness, justice and lawfulness are distributed unevenly and unequally
across racial and class lines, crime remains rampant in some communities
but not others, and some people can trust and rely on law enforcement
while others cannot.' 7 Official disregard of crime is part of this dynamic, as
are mass imprisonment, excessive sentences, and racially skewed
enforcement practices.
This Article aims to elevate underenforcement as a socio-legal, normative
phenomenon in its own right, with predictable effects and distinctive legal
characteristics. One byproduct of this effort is to enrich the discussion of
overenforcement by providing a better appreciation of its counterpart. Part I
provides a spectrum of underenforcement examples and explores their
diverse implications for the criminal process, including their impact on
urban residents, prostitutes, undocumented workers, and victims of
domestic violence. 18 These examples illuminate how underenforcement is
one way the state participates in social contests over resources, power, and
legitimacy by staying its enforcement hand in selective ways. Because the
losers in these contests are those who cannot command the state's full
support, underenforcement reveals important facets of the distributive and
normative operations of the criminal system.
In its effort to provide a factually rich description of underenforcement
practices, Part I confronts a practical difficulty with obtaining direct
evidence of nonenforcement. 19 While there is a myriad of data regarding
16. The term "nonresponsive" is, by some accounts, too polite. See, e.g., Dorothy E.
Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1945 (1993) (arguing that the

criminal system purposely controls and suppresses African Americans).
17. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and
(Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The NeighborhoodContext ofRacial Differences, 32
Law & Soc'y Rev. 777, 783 (1998) (reviewing studies indicating that normlessness and

"anomie" most affect "members of economically and racially isolated communities, that is,
those who [are] least able to exercise political influence to obtain community services").
18. See Sklansky,

supra note

11,

at

1818

(noting that evaluating

the actual

(anti)democratic impact of criminal justice practices such as community policing "is an
empirical question; it is a question that no theory of democracy, no matter how sophisticated,
can hope to resolve"); see also Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement
in Democratic Society 15 (1966) ("That law is an enterprise summons us to its empirical
study. It reminds us that highly general propositions about law may be either circular or
premature.").
19. Cf Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: LowVisibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 554 (1960) (noting

that police nonenforcement decisions are not visible to the community and relying on
confidential police records to document police policies not to enforce drug laws against
snitches, not to pursue assault charges when victims failed to sign the complaint, and not to
arrest certain gambling offenders). Systemic underenforcement actually reduces the amount
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the crimes that law enforcement chooses to pursue, much less information
exists about crimes for which police fail to make an arrest or for which
prosecutors decline to bring charges. 20 This makes the underenforcement
phenomenon rather difficult to pin down. 2 1 Part I thus marshals indirect as
well as anecdotal evidence in an effort to present a more complete picture
of the underenforcement phenomenon.
Underenforcement encompasses a broad spectrum of state behavior, not
all of which is pernicious. Sometimes underenforcement is unremarkable
or an incidental byproduct of larger political or legal phenomena.
Sometimes it is appropriate or even positive. The last two examples in Part
II-the underenforcement of intellectual property rights on the Internet, and
law enforcement restraint in the face of civil disobedience-explore the
potentially positive attributes of underenforcement. Often lauded from
privacy, free market, or civil liberties points of view, these examples
illustrate that full enforcement of the law may not always be desirable from
a democratic or distributive perspective.
With this broad range of possible interpretations, distinguishing "good"
underenforcement from "bad" poses an analytic challenge. Part II surveys
the sources and effects of underenforcement and proposes a descriptive
framework for identifying which forms of underenforcement may be
democratically or legally problematic and which are unremarkable or even
positive. This framework solidifies the intuition developed through the
examples in Part I: When it disadvantages already vulnerable groups or
impedes their ability to participate fully in civic life, underenforcement
becomes a form of public policy that deserves special scrutiny above and
beyond the deference traditionally given to law enforcement discretion.
As a doctrinal matter, underenforcement tends to slip beneath the radar.
Nonenforcement is neither judicially reviewable nor actionable, and thus it
tends to play second fiddle to overenforcement, which is more easily
documented and litigated. Part III proposes three legal conceptualizations
of "crime" that exists because it deprives violations of official recognition and removes them
from public view. See Goetz, supra note 11, at 582 ("The amount of crime that officially
'exists' depends on the state's capacity and willingness to ferret it out and label it." (citing
Henry N. Pontell, Kitty Calavita & Robert Tillman, Corporate Crime and CriminalJustice
System Capacity: Government Response to FinancialInstitution Fraud,11 Just. Q. 383, 384

(1994))).
20. For example, the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which bypasses
police recordkeeping to ask populations directly about their experiences with crime, shows
significant divergences between experienced crime levels and crimes recorded by police.
Janet L. Lauritsen & Robin Schaum, Crime and Victimization in the Three Largest
(Mar.
2005),
available
at
Metropolitan
Areas,
1980-98,
at
4-7
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv3lma98.pdf (finding higher reported victimization
rates than indicated by official police crime statistics). For example, in Los Angeles between
1986 and 1998, the NCVS indicates burglary rates reported to police to be significantly
higher than L.A. Police Department rates of reported burglary, although flaws in crime
reporting make it impossible to attribute those divergences to any one source. Id. at 5.
21. It may also begin to explain the lack of attention to it. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at
522 ("[N]o one knows how any given criminal statute is enforced in any given state. Even in
a single locality, only a few cops and a handful of prosecutors may know.").
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of underenforcement in an effort to give it a more robust legal identity and
to locate it more centrally within ongoing debates over the doctrines and
structure of the American criminal system.
First, underenforcement can be understood as a direct function of the
system's commitment to broad law enforcement discretion, an approach
which engages two distinct facets of the underenforcement problem. As a
matter of legal authority, discretionary underenforcement embodies the
possibility that the law will be unevenly or unpredictably applied, raising
formal rule-of-law type problems. Underenforcement is also a form of "law
in action," a set of social practices that reveal-and thus permit criticism
of-how police actually treat the policed, distribute law enforcement
resources, and otherwise exercise their discretionary authority.
Second, underenforcement can also be conceptualized as a problem of
democratic legitimacy that arises with special force when the state polices
the socially disenfranchised. 22
Part III thus explores the system's
undemocratic tendency to ignore or discriminate against disfavored groups
and the politically powerless, and the special implications this tendency has
for the police power.
Finally, underenforcement of criminal law is a subspecies of the U.S.
Supreme Court's more general constitutional commitment to a "negative
liberties" jurisprudence and the Court's reluctance to impose positive
welfare obligations on the state. This section reconsiders that commitment
in the context of policing, the recognition of lawfulness as a socially
valuable good, and the state's role in maintaining individual security, social
stability, and the rule of law.
Underenforcement has many faces: The United States is peppered with
all sorts of underenforcement zones, arenas in which underenforcement has
reached systemic proportions affecting the local quality and meaning of
lawfulness.
These "zones"
are not necessarily geographic:
Underenforcement may characterize a discrete institution or the treatment
of a particular group. 23 Underenforcement, moreover, is not necessarily an
evil in itself. It becomes problematic when it weakens broader values of
public protection, official evenhandedness, respect for the law, and
democratic responsiveness. Under other circumstances, it can reflect
appropriate limits to the law enforcement function and a healthy respect for
other values.
The ambition of this Article is to call attention to
underenforcement as a powerful phenomenon in its own right, as well as to

22. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations

of American Government, at xv (2005) (asking whether "the power to police, and the
criminal law with it, can survive in a modem democratic state").
23. Cf Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1197, 1201 (1996)

(identifying Guantanamo, formal "red light districts," and the District of Columbia as
"'anomalous zone[s],' [] geographical area[s] in which certain legal rules, otherwise
regarded as embodying fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally
suspended").
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highlight its contributions to some of the most dysfunctional aspects of the
justice system.
I. THE SPECTRUM: EXAMPLES OF UNDERENFORCEMENT

Underenforcement embodies a wide spectrum of governmental responses
to crime and victimization. Underenforcement can reflect official neglect,
outright hostility to victimized groups, or favoritism toward an offending
class. It can also be a function of broader social conflict over the meaning
of the law itself and the appropriateness of full enforcement.
Underenforcement can even embody a considered judgment that the
government should stay its enforcement hand in the face of competing
values. The following examples illustrate the range of possibilities, with
special focus on the role of underenforcement as a potential vehicle for
official disadvantaging and discrimination.
A. Urban Underenforcement
"When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,'
then there are sown the seeds of anarchy--of self-help, vigilante justice,
and lynch law."
-Justice Potter Stewart, concurring in Furman v.
Georgia,408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972)
24
"We know no one will protect us. We have to protect ourselves."
-Jay, age 28, resident of a high-crime Los Angeles
neighborhood

A defining aspect of living in high-crime urban communities is that
police often fail to respond to crime. Police openly let certain sorts of
criminality slide, and residents know that their complaints may be
responded to weakly or not at all. While it is commonplace to contrast
official tolerance of "white-collar crime" with intolerance of "street" or
traditional crime, 25 this comparison elides the fact that in some
neighborhoods, street crime is officially accepted as a fact of life. Because
policing traditional street crime is perhaps the quintessential police
function, urban underenforcement is a paradigmatic example of the
underenforcement phenomenon and its potential harms.
While some direct evidence of urban underenforcement exists, much of
the data is anecdotal or indirect. As one researcher put it, urban
underenforcement is "one of those things that 'everyone knows,' but for

24. Jill Leovy & Doug Smith, Mortal Wounds: Getting Away With Murder in South
L.A. 's Killing Zone, L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 2004, at Al.
25. See Brown, supra note 8; Goetz, supra note 11, at 569.
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which there is no firm evidence. '2 6 It is generally recognized that "poor
urban areas are chronically under-policed. ' 27
Generally speaking,
sociological "research has found that ... [c]ompared to higher status
neighborhoods with lower crime rates, . . . in minority neighborhoods with
high crime rates, police seem to offer less service to victims (they are less
prone to offer assistance to residents and less likely to file incident
reports)."' 2 8 This urban underenforcement takes various forms, including
unsolved homicides, permitted open-air drug markets, slow or nonexistent
911 responses, and the tolerance of pervasive, low levels of violence,
property crimes, and public disorder. The sources of the phenomena are
likewise diverse: inadequate funding for urban area services, official
expectations about crime and disorder in politically weak neighborhoods,
police hostility to and fear of residents, 29 and residents' distrust of police.
It is also well recognized that poor urban communities of color suffer
from higher crime and victimization rates than do more affluent white
neighborhoods 30 and that African Americans (who tend to live in poor
urban communities) are disproportionately victimized. 3 1 But it is unclear
precisely how law enforcement decision making contributes to these trends,
in part because underenforcement is so often informal and unacknowledged
by police themselves. As Kenneth Culp Davis explained thirty years ago,
"The central fact is that the police falsely pretend to enforce all criminal
law; the reason for the pretense is that they believe the law requires them to
''
enforce all criminal law but they are unable to [do so]. 32
The relationship between policing and crime is complex. Some police
failures exacerbate crime, others may have no direct impact on criminality
at all, and crime rates rise and fall for many reasons having nothing to do

26. Rodney Stark, Deviant Places: A Theory of the Ecology of Crime, 25 Criminology
893, 902 (1987) (asserting that "stigmatized neighborhoods will suffer from more lenient
law enforcement").
27. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 8, at 292 (arguing that in the economic "race-to-thebottom," states tend to underregulate criminal law in ways that justify increased federal
intervention in local criminal enforcement); see also Stuntz, supra note 10.
28. Sara Stoutland, The Multiple Dimensions of Trust in Resident/Police Relations in
Boston, 38 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 226, 231 (2001).
29. See, e.g., John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson, Criminal Inequality in America, in Crime
and Inequality 14, 24 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) ("[There is] much
evidence that [American] police perceive the attitudes and behaviors of minority youth as
hostile and threatening.").
30. Id. at 20 ("Street crime and victimization are increasingly concentrated in the
racially segregated neighborhoods of urban settings."); see also Carol J. DeFrances & Steven
K. Smith, Bureau of Justice Statistics Crime Data Brief: Crime and Neighborhoods (June
1994), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/can.txt ("Central city households
(15%) were more likely to have identified crime as a neighborhood problem.., than
suburban households (5%) or rural households (2%).").
31. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 19-20 (documenting high African-American victimization
rates).
32. Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Discretion, at III (1975).
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with policing. 33 Indeed, there is substantial scholarly skepticism about the
impact that policing is capable of having on crime rates, particularly the
reactive policing of the inner-city beat.34 Accordingly, the study of
underenforcement-the complex interaction of personal and institutional
responses that police bring to bear on neighborhood demands-is also an
inquiry into the relationship between those responses and crime.
Some leading discussions of urban crime implicitly take
underenforcement for granted, in the form of the general assumption that
police do not (or perhaps cannot) control crime, focusing instead on how
communities fail to police themselves. 35 But even if the sources of crime
lie in "community structures and cultures, ' 36 community-based
explanations can obscure important enforcement failures that contribute to
those structures and cultures and for which state actors remain responsible.
Accordingly, the discussion below probes more specifically the
contributions of police underenforcement practices to urban crime and
victimization, even while recognizing that these practices are at most one
piece of a larger causal puzzle.
1. Underenforcement of Serious Crimes
Received wisdom has it that police and prosecutors "invariably" or
"almost always" pursue, arrest, and charge perpetrators for serious
felonies. 3 7 But this rule of thumb is imperfect. For a constellation of
reasons, including under-funding, lack of political will, and poor policecommunity relations, serious crimes in inner cities often go unaddressed.
33. See Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and
Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1551, 1554 (2003)
(documenting a "vicious cycle" in which increased incarceration leads to increased crime
which in turn leads to more arrests which increase incarceration); see id. at 1557 n.36
(surveying competing explanations for crime decline including policing, drug market and
demand fluctuations, changes in economic and employment conditions, and demography).
34. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Thinking About Crime: Sense and Sensibility in American
Penal Culture 106-09 (2004) (surveying long-term studies of the decline of crime in the
nineteenth century that describe police impact on crime as "minimal," "too thin to make
much difference," and generally better understood as part of larger changes in the social
order).
35. See, e.g., Tracey Meares & Dan Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of
Unwanted Rights, in Urgent Times: Policing and Rights in Inner-City Communities 3, 13-14
(Tracey Meares & Dan Kahan eds., 1999); Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson,
Toward a Theory of Race, Crime and Urban Inequality, in Crime and Inequality, supra note
29, at 37, 38 ("[T]he macrosocial or community-level of explanation [for crime] asks what it
is about community structures and cultures that produces differential rates of crime.").
36. Sampson & Wilson, supra note 35, at 38.
37. See George C. Thomas III, The End of the Roadfor Miranda v. Arizona?: On the
History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 39 (2000)
("Police will almost always engage in a thorough investigation of serious crime, and
prosecutors will almost always prosecute the best suspect the police can find. These are their
jobs."); see also Erik Luna, PrincipledEnforcement of Penal Codes, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev.
515, 551-52 (2000) ("If there is probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a
murder, for instance, the police will invariably arrest and the prosecutors will invariably
charge.").
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In Los Angeles, California, for example, of the 11,000 homicides since
1988, there are nearly 6000 for which no arrest was ever made; threequarters of those homicides are concentrated in one-quarter of the city. 38 In
the neighborhood now known as South L.A. (formerly South Central), more
than half of all killers are never caught. Unsolved homicide rates correlate
not only to neighborhood poverty and racial segregation, but also to thinner
police forces, reflecting the unequal allocation of public resources. 39 For
example, while the Compton area suffers the city's highest homicide rates,
it has only seventy-five full-time police deputies, while the neighboring
southeast division-with dropping homicide rates-employs more than 250
officers to patrol a comparable geographical area and has an only slightly
larger population. 40 Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton criticized
the city for devoting so few resources to policing "one of the most
dangerous cities in America. Sorry, you get what you pay for," he said.
'4 1
"It's incredible what's going on over there."
Baltimore, Maryland, similarly suffers from a long history of
underenforcement of serious crimes in its poorest and most dangerous
neighborhoods. With an overall murder rate over seven times the national
average, 42 the 1998 murder rate for African Americans in Baltimore was six
times higher than for whites. 4 3 While there are numerous contributing
factors, residents and officials alike blame these trends, at least in part, on
police underenforcement.
Some residents perceive the police as
unresponsive or even indifferent to crime and victimization, asserting that
"police have become reluctant in their desire to fight crime." 44 One
resident reported that she "called the police over twenty times to arrest
known drug dealers in front of her house and the police still did not
appear." Even the city's acting Police Commissioner, Edward T. Norris,
recognized that police failure accounted for some part of the city's violence.
"[Baltimore] is a city where many members of the general public have lost
faith in the resolve, skill, and even integrity of their police," 4 5 he said.

38. Leovy & Smith, supra note 24.
39. See id. (documenting higher homicide caseloads in poor high-crime neighborhoods
and the reluctance of city officials to shift resources to high-crime areas).
40. Megan Garvey, Compton Killings Highest in Years, L.A. Times, Jan. 2, 2006, at BI
(describing a sheriffs response to increased homicides as "surprisingly passive").
41. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Office of the Mayor, The Mayor's Plan to Dramatically Reduce Crime in Baltimore,
Executive
Summary
1
(Apr.
5,
2000),
available
at
http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/downloads/pdfs/Mayor's%20Pan%20to%2ODrastically%20r
educe%20Crime%20in%20Baltimore.pdf [hereinafter Baltimore Mayor's Report] (noting
that in 1998 Baltimore was ranked second in the nation in violent crime and second in
murder rate among large cities).
43. Id. at 27 (describing African-American victimization); see also 2003 Kids Count
Factbook
for
Baltimore
City
108-09,
138-39
(2003),
available
at
http://www.baltimorekidsdata.org/Factbook.pdf (documenting crime disparities between
wealthy and poor neighborhoods).
44. Baltimore Mayor's Report, supra note 42, at 41.
45. Id. at I (Mayor's Executive Summary).
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An infamous 2002 incident revealed the depths of police inattention to
drug dealing and violence. Angela Dawson and her family had repeatedly
called the police and 311 about drug dealing in their neighborhood, but the
drug dealers about whom they complained were at best chased away, and
often the police failed to respond at all. When threats against the family
were relayed to the police, the police provided no additional protection.
When an individual later assaulted Mrs. Dawson, he was arrested and
released the next morning. Finally, after months of police inaction, drug
dealers arranged a firebombing in retaliation for the family's complaints.
46
Mrs. Dawson and five of her children died in the attack.
Other cities exhibit similar underenforcement tendencies. According to a
study conducted by The DallasMorning News:
The murder rate in southern Dallas [a high-poverty section of the city]
is twice as high as in the rest of the city. Assaults are nearly twice as
likely ....Business or home burglaries are one and a half times higher in
the south than in the north.
Police response times are slow citywide by national standards-and
they're worst in the highest-crime areas. And the officers patrolling those
neighborhoods are the department's least experienced ....
.."We've
. abandoned4 7the people and the neighborhoods," [says]
Police Chief David Kunkle.
The Dallas Police Department's own study indicated that "[r]andom
gunfire, alleged prostitution, and other nuisance complaints get low priority
and often no follow-up"; that "[p]roperty crimes are rarely investigated and
are typically handled over the telephone by an expediter-most residents
found this to be an unacceptable response by the police department"; and
that "[t]he general feeling among members of the Hispanic community is to
'stay clear of officers."' 4 8
In a recent federal lawsuit, the predominantly Latino Unincorporated
Neighborhoods
(LUN)
near
Modesto,
California,
described
underenforcement in their community as follows:
Despite consistently high crime levels, the [LUN] do not receive
adequate protection from the Sheriff or Modesto Police. Patrols of the

46. Complaint of McNack, et al. v. State of Maryland (Baltimore Cir. Ct., Feb. 16,
2005); Del Quentin Wilber, Recordings, Court Documents Show Dawson Family's Battles:
911, 311 Requests For Help Made One Month Before Fire Show Fear, Frustration,Bait.

Sun, Feb. 17, 2003, at lB. After the Dawson's house was firebombed for the second time in
a month, the city was sued in part under the theory that it had promised protection to city
residents, and it never delivered. See id.
47. Tanya Eiserer, Looking South: Dallasat the Tipping Point: Area's Crime Problem
Scaring off Developers, Dallas Morning News, Dec. 14, 2004, at 22A.

48. Dallas Police Department Management and Efficiency Study, Summary of Focus
Groups and Meetings with Citizens and Community Representatives, at XXIII-2-4
(Berkshire
Advisors,
Inc.
Sept.
2004),
available
at
http://www.dallascityhall.com/pdf/police/CitizenParticipation.pdf.
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[LUN] by law enforcement are too infrequent and law enforcement does
not respond sufficiently to calls from residents of the [LUN]. The
Sheriffs office has at times responded slowly, or in some cases, did not
respond at all, to reports of home break-ins or other crimes, even those in
progress. As a result of the Sheriffs lack of patrols and lack of response
or slow response to calls originating from the [LUN],
street crime and
49
property damage are high in these neighborhoods.
Open air drug markets are another infamous example of urban
underenforcement. While some cities have made concerted efforts to
disperse such markets, residents and researchers alike have expressed their
shock at the extent to which police tolerate such open criminality. 50
Law enforcement unresponsiveness creates a vicious cycle: Criminals
grow bold, while residents grow reluctant to cooperate with police, making
serious crimes such as drug dealing and homicide harder to solve, and
police more reluctant to work on them.
In those "hardest-hit
neighborhoods, people describe how fear, and the conviction that serious
crimes are not solved, makes them reluctant to confront homicide,
unwilling to cooperate with authorities or act as witnesses, and disinclined
to place their faith in the police. ' '5' Potential victims-mostly black and
Latino young men-see the police as "unreliable and hostile," and conclude
that the police will not protect them. 52 Police likewise describe their
alienation from residents, their fear of going into high-crime areas, 53 and
54
their conviction that "the people here hate us."
2. Petty Offenses
Recent policing reform trends such as "zero tolerance" and "quality of
life" have called attention to the pervasive underenforcement of urban petty
offenses such as loitering, public drunkenness and disorder, littering, and

49. Second Amended Complaint at 8-9, CCCI v. Modesto, No. CIV-F-04-6121 (E.D.
Cal. May 27, 2005) (on file with author).
50. See Lynn Zimmer, American Inner-Cities and Drug Policing: Strategies that
Maximize
Harm
to Individuals
and
Communities
(1995),
available at
www.drugtext.org/library/articles/ziml .html (surveying law enforcement efforts to eliminate
open air drug dealing and concluding that while "there have been a few successes," the
successes occur mainly in middle class communities and that "[i]n poor communities, the
open drug markets are never dismantled"); Baltimore Mayor's Report, supra note 42
(residents reporting that they suspect the police routinely drive by open air drug markets and
do nothing).
51. Leovy & Smith, supra note 24.
52. Id.
53. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
NeighborhoodSafety, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 1982, at 29, 35 ("Some Chicago officers tell of
times when they were afraid to enter [high crime housing projects].").
54. Leovy & Smith, supra note 24; see also Jeremy M. Wilson & K. Jack Riley,
Violence in East and West Oakland: Description and Intervention 14 (RAND Public Safety
and
Justice,
Working
Paper
No.
WR- 129-OJP,
2004),
available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/working-papers/2004/RANDWR129.pdf (describing high-crime
community's "general contempt for the police").
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graffiti. In many city neighborhoods, the police simply ignore such petty
street crimes, requiring residents to navigate around them. Indeed, a
defining difference between poor and wealthy neighborhoods is often the
degree to which police tolerate visible petty offenses.
Quality-of-life reformers tend to focus on the asserted criminogenic
effects of such disorder, but they implicitly accept the notion that
underenforcement of the law exists and can have independent harmful
effects on the communities in which it occurs. 55 In the seminal article
Broken Windows, James Wilson and George Kelling describe the process of
urban decay in large part in terms of the normative impact of law
enforcement laissez-faire:
Citizens complain to the police chief [about petty offenses], but he
explains that his department is low on personnel and that the courts do not
punish petty or first-time offenders. To the residents, the police who
arrive in squad cars are either ineffective or uncaring; to the police, the
residents are animals who deserve each other. The citizens
may soon stop
56
calling the police, because "they can't do anything."

Community attitudes towards the police reflect glaring local awareness of
underenforcement. Urban residents routinely assert their belief that calling
the police is futile, that the "police don't do nothing," 57 that "the police
never listen[] to us," 58 and that "you have to act hysterical when you call
59
911 if you want them to take you seriously."

55. The criminogenic effects of disorder are contested. Compare Wesley G. Skogan,
Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods 10 (1990)
(describing theories that attribute criminogenic properties to disorder), with Robert J.
Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A
New Look at Disorderin Urban Neighborhoods, 105 Am. J. Soc. 603, 638 (1999) (arguing
that broken windows and visible disorder do not create crime but rather flow from the same
underlying sources).
56. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 53, at 33.
57. Leovy & Smith, supra note 24 (quoting resident).
58. Daniel Hemandez, A Plea for Public Safety, L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 2004, at B3
(quoting a Crenshaw resident who repeatedly called police to report drug and prostitution
activity in a neighbor's house).
59. Mike Reilly, Other Omahans Tell of 911 FrustrationConcern Not Limited to One
Area of the City, Omaha World Herald, Mar. 14, 1995, at Al. More broadly, many African
Americans report that they "believe that the police and the courts fail to protect them from
these growing problems of crime." Hagan & Peterson, supra note 29, at 24. This is not to
attribute all such cynicism to criminal justice issues: African-American distrust of police
and government is historical and complex and cannot be reduced to a response to crime and
punishment. See, e.g., Sampson & Bartusch, supra note 17, at 783-84 (noting that the fact
that "low-income and minority-group populations are most likely to perceive injustice in the
application of legal norms and to express cynicism about the legitimacy of laws and the
ability of the police" is itself "contextual in origin and not reducible to differences in crime
rates" but rather should be understood "in the structural context of disadvantage and
resources exploitation across neighborhoods"); see also Sampson & Wilson, supra note 35
(arguing that crime and attitudes towards deviance in poor black communities are functions
of broader economic and social forces of segregation and disadvantage).
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3. Law Enforcement as a Public Service Resource
Criminal underenforcement is part of a larger cycle of public service
failure in poor urban neighborhoods. 60 Public education is typically
segregated and of poor quality; 6 1 housing, health, and safety codes are
underenforced; and sewage, garbage pickup, and pest control services are
lax. 62 These failures are symptoms of larger political disinvestments in
inner cities; they also have independent force and exacerbate one another.
Service failures reflect official tolerance of violations in these
communities. As explained bluntly by one housing code inspector in
Boston, Massachusetts,
You adjust your
Certain areas Will tolerate certain violations.
enforcement to the peculiarities of the neighborhood you are in. If
something doesn't upset the neighbors why stir up a bucket of [expletive
deleted]?
In Back Bay [a wealthy Boston neighborhood] you'll get a complaint
and a woman will show you a few scraps of paper and call it rubbish ....
In Dorchester [a poor, high-crime neighborhood].... there are dead rats
They're different
and dogs on the streets and nobody complains.
environments; the people have different expectations.
If you are on a spotless block and one house has a minor exterior
violation you will call it. If this same violation is in a sleazy area, you
It depends on the
ignore it .... How much is too much trash?
63
neighborhood.

The under-provision of public services is, in turn, directly related to crime
because it contributes to social and economic deterioration, or what Robert
Sampson and William Julius Wilson call the "pattern of destabilizing
feedback [that is] central to an understanding of the role of governmental

60. See Gershon M. Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the
Provision of Municipal Services, 4 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 1-12 (1968) (documenting
municipal failures to provide equal police, education, roads, trash collection, parks, and other
public services to poor communities of color).
61. Jonathan Kozol, The Shame of the Nation: The Restoration of Apartheid Schooling
in America 19 (2005) (documenting the continuing poor quality and pervasive segregation in
U.S. public schools, with seventy-five percent of nonwhite children in predominantly
nonwhite schools and two million children of color in "apartheid schools" in which ninetynine percent of the students are nonwhite).
62. Lee Romney, Poor Neighborhoods Left Behind, L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 2005, at B I
(documenting lack of sewage, sidewalks, traffic controls, and other public services in poor
Latino unincorporated areas); see also Second Amended Complaint, supra note 49 (alleging
same); Dallas Police Department Management and Efficiency Study, supra note 48, at
XXIII-3 (documenting residents complaints that "[c]ode violations at high-density apartment
complexes cause high levels of crime").
63. H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, 6 ABA J.
Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L. 29, 35 (1996).
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policies in fostering the downward spiral of high
crime areas ... [and] the
'64
institutional desertification of the urban core."
One way of understanding underenforcement, therefore, is as another
form of resource deprivation, such as understaffed police departments,
untrained officers, and other social capital deficits.
This resource
deprivation is a form of social disinvestment. It reflects not only the
political weakness of inner cities in the competition for resources, but also
the predominant judgments about how much disorder, decay, and
underenforcement poor communities should be required to tolerate. 65 In
other words, the assertion that inner cities are crime-ridden because more
crime is committed there reflects only half of the dilemma; the other half
lurks in the state's incomplete response.
4. Constructive Underenforcdment?
Despite the many harms associated with urban underenforcement, not all
its manifestations carry the same negative implications.
Sometimes
underenforcement represents a considered judgment that arrest or other
coercive response would be ineffective or overbearing. The old-fashioned
beat officer model included the idea that police officers might reprimand
local alcoholics, disarm but not arrest quarrelling fighters, lecture larcenous
youth, and otherwise refrain from enforcing criminal laws against public
drunkenness, assault, and theft. Current community policing models laud
the idea that the police officer who personally knows individuals in the
community need not always arrest lawbreakers, but may have more flexible
and effective responses available. 66 Part II attempts the admittedly difficult
64. Sampson & Wilson, supra note 59, at 48-49 ("[L]ax enforcement of city housing
codes played a major role in accelerating the deterioration of inner-city Chicago
neighborhoods... [as well as] the systematic decline of New York City's housing stock, and
consequently, entire neighborhoods.... Decisions to withdraw city municipal services for
public health and fire safety-presumably made with little if any thought to crime and
violence-also appear to have been salient in the social disintegration of poor
communities.... The loss of social integration and networks from planned shrinkage of
services may increase behavioral patterns of violence that may themselves become
'convoluted with processes of urban decay likely to further disrupt social networks and cause
further social disintegration."' (quoting R. Wallace & D. Wallace, Origins of Public Health
Collapse in New York City: The Dynamics of Planned Shrinkage, Contagious Urban Decay
and Social Disintegration,Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med. 391, 427 (1990))).
65. This is not to say that disinvesting in police forces always accompanies
disinvestment in other social services. A common complaint is that the government
disinvests in community resources even as it calls for more police and prisons. See, e.g.,
John R. Dunne, Op-Ed., When Will New York Correct Its Mistake?, N.Y. Times, May 10,
2002, at A35 (bemoaning that "[i]nstead of investing in education and services that would
improve people's lives, we have chosen to invest in prisons. New York now sends more
African-American and Latino men to prison each year than it graduates from its state
colleges and universities"); David K. Shipler, Op-Ed., Children GoingHungry, Wash. Post,
Feb. 27, 2005, at B7 (arguing that federal budget cuts in food stamps and housing subsidies
will lead to increased social problems).
66. Brown, supra note 8, at 1348 (collecting stories of cooperative, nonpunitive
policing); Wilson & Kelling, supra note 53, at 3 (describing a foot-patrol officer's order-
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task of drawing lines between harmful official neglect and appropriate
discretionary flexibility.
B. Prostitution
Prostitution is an infamous "underenforcement zone." 67 Not only is the
crime of prostitution itself routinely underenforced against prostitutes, and
even more so against customers (so-called "johns"), 6 8 but a constellation of
other underenforcement practices spring up in association with the tolerance
of the sex trade, including the under-protection of prostitutes from other
crimes and the tolerance of criminality in prostitution-heavy areas. 6 9 This
underenforcement contributes to the lawlessness and violence that
surrounds the prostitution industry, alienates prostitutes from legal
70
institutions, and creates distrust of the police in surrounding communities.
Prostitution is in some ways a subset of the urban underenforcement
phenomenon described above, often associated with urban decay and a
frequent target of community policing programs. However, it has special
characteristics that deserve additional attention. First, prostitution is a
prime example of how underenforcement exacerbates lawlessness. Official
toleration of prostitution is tied to the underenforcement of numerous other
laws, driving a wedge between law enforcement and community residents,
including prostitutes themselves. Prostitution also highlights the official
tendency to withhold full legal protection from those who have broken the
law in some way, a socially destructive and legally problematic aspect of
underenforcement.
The criminal offense of prostitution is enforced infrequently and
unevenly. Many prostitutes who work off the street are never arrested,
while "streetwalkers," who are arrested more frequently, are often

maintenance behavior: "Sometimes what [Officer] Kelly did could be described as
'enforcing the law,' but just as often it involved taking informal or extra-legal steps to help
protect what the neighborhood had decided was the appropriate level of public order"). But
see Harcourt, supra note 15, at 176, 213 (arguing that order-maintenance policing authorizes
overenforcement in the form of excessive arrests).
67. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
68. See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcment of Vice Laws, 54 Rutgers
L. Rev. 423, 425 (2002) ("[M]ost federal, state, and municipal enforcement agencies tend to
monitor and punish these consensual crimes [such as prostitution] in a lax and inconsistent
manner that supplies little reliable indication as to the effective legal standard."); Luna,
supra note 37, at 552-54 (noting that the Model Penal Code drafters recognized that such
"laws are continually violated"); Neuman, supra note 23, at 1208 ("[TIhe United States...
has a long history of informally tolerated vice zones in which brothels, while technically
illegal, have been permitted to flourish.").
69. This phenomenon overlaps with the urban underenforcement phenomenon described
in the previous section. See supra Part I.A.
70. Despite widespread underenforcement, law enforcement still expends significant
resources on prostitution. See Julie Pearl, The Highest Paying Customers: America's Cities
and the Costs of ProstitutionControl, 38 Hastings L.J. 769, 772 (1987) (estimating that in
1985 each of the nation's largest cities spent an average of $7.5 million on prostitution law
enforcement).
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immediately released. 7 1 Customers are arrested even more rarely. 72 This
high level of nonenforcement is also racially skewed: Prostitutes who are
arrested are overwhelmingly minority women. 73 This underenforcement is
public and official: Police, prosecutors, and judges openly make resource
allocation decisions based on the assumption that prostitution laws will
74
remain underenforced.
At the same time, crimes such as assault, robbery, and rape against
prostitutes are common, while police responses to prostitute victimization
are weak. 75 One study explained,
Crimes against prostitutes usually go unpunished. There is a tacit
acceptance of this form of violence. .. . The overwhelming majority of
[prostitutes surveyed] did not go to the police after they experienced
violent incidents. ... Others who attempted to report violent crimes were
told by the police that their complaints would not be accepted .... 76

71. Kate DeCou, U.S. Social Policy on Prostitution: Whose Welfare is Served?, 24 New
Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 427, 428, 436 (1998) (noting that "[plolice primarily
arrest prostitutes from the streetwalking population," although street prostitutes comprise
only ten to twenty percent of all prostitutes); see also Barnett, supra note 68, at 433
(describing "chronic underenforcement" (citing Eleanor M. Miller et al., The United States,
in Prostitution: An International Handbook on Trends, Problems, and Policies 300, 308-09
(1993))).
72. See, e.g., Diane Mason, Equal Justice: Women, Men & the Law of the Land, St.
Petersburg Times, Sept. 30, 1990, at 6F (reporting a Florida study documenting harsher jail
sentences given to prostitutes compared to male customers who often received only a fine);
Michael Moline, Study Says ProstitutionCrime of Power, Violence, United Press Int'l, Sept.
20, 1998 (reporting a Florida study sponsored by the state supreme court, quoting Justice
Gerald Kogan, "It is almost unheard of for a male as a customer to be sent to jail"); Daria
Mueller, Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, Curbing the Demand for Prostitution 1 (Fall 2005),
available
at
http://www.chicagohomeless.org/factsfigures/PolicyPaper%20Fal105.pdf
(documenting that in Chicago in 2004, 3204 prostitutes were arrested but only 950 "johns"
were arrested).
73. Luna, supra note 37, at 558 ("Ninety percent of all prostitution arrests and eightyfive percent of those incarcerated are minority women.").
74. See, e.g., Vince Horiuchi, Jailers Turning Away Prostitutes, Salt Lake Trib., Feb. 3.
1996, at El ("Jailers have been ordered to turn away hookers, even though new jail space
opened three weeks ago to curb Salt Lake County's increasing prostitution crimes."); Terry
Oblander, Residents Criticize FreeingProstitutes,Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Sept. 19, 1995,
at BI (reporting that "Common Pleas Court judges had signed an order that would release
women charged with prostitution when jail space for women became overcrowded" and
would "also prohibit police from even booking suspected prostitutes when the jail is full").
75. See, e.g., Urban Justice Ctr., Revolving Door: An Analysis of Street-Based
Prostitution in New York City 8 (2003) [hereinafter Revolving Door], available at
http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/RevolvingDoorExecSum.pdf
(documenting
pervasive violence and crime against prostitutes by customers); Alan Feuer, Guardians on
the Streets of Despair: New Jersey Task Force Focuses on Crimes Against Prostitutes,N.Y.
Times, July 28, 1998, at B 1 (noting that the county had "neglected" fourteen unsolved cases
of homicides of black prostitutes until the election of Essex County's first black female
prosecutor); Melissa Farley. Prostitution Research & Educ., Prostitution: Factsheet on
Human Rights Violations (Apr. 2, 2000), http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/factsheet.html
(citing various worldwide studies that estimate between sixty-eight to eighty percent of
prostitutes have been raped, most of them repeatedly, and that eighty-three percent are
assault victims).
76. Revolving Door, supra note 75, at 6.

2006]

UNDERENFORCEMENT

1733

The Los Angeles Police Department used to designate crimes against
prostitutes "NHI," which stands for "no humans involved. '77 Official data,
moreover, tend to understate the extent of victimization because prostitutes
underreport crimes committed against them, in part for fear of arrest and in
part because of their accurate perception that police do not take crimes

against them seriously.
Above and beyond failing to protect prostitutes, police themselves often
commit crimes against prostitutes. Common practices include demanding
sex in return for the decision not to arrest, trading protection for sex, and
raping prostitutes. 78 Official harassment of prostitutes also correlates with
racial harassment; some studies indicate that prostitutes of color are more
likely to receive illegal police treatment. 79 Unsurprisingly, these corrupt
practices undermine the legitimacy of the police. According to researchers,
"[S]treet women regard the police as just another gang, people from whom
one can receive drugs, against whom one sometimes needs protection, and
80
for whom sexual services may be performed in return for leniency."
More broadly, underenforcement practices erode the lawfulness of the
environments in which prostitution takes place. Nineteenth century redlight districts were neighborhoods officially set aside where prostitution,
liquor, and gambling laws were relaxed, and other forms of criminality
were notorious. 81 Today, residents of prostitution-heavy neighborhoods
often complain that police do not enforce laws regarding alcohol, drugs,
loitering, noise, and other public nuisances. 82
In response, many

77. Al Martinez, Women on the Avenue, L.A. Times, Aug. 9, 1996, at B5 ("It was
generally accepted [by the L.A. Police Department] that if a hooker was raped or murdered
she got what was coming to her ...").
78. E.g., David Kocieniewski & John Sullivan, Newark Police Troubled: Out of Control
at the Top, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1995, at Al (documenting police rape, robbery, and beating
of prostitutes that went undisciplined); Josh Kovner, Officers Accused of Misconduct:
Prostitutes' Allegations Prompt Investigation, Hartford Courant (Conn.), Oct. 1, 1998, at B 1
(reporting an investigation into widespread Hartford police practices of assaulting and
extorting sex from prostitutes); Revolving Door, supra note 75, at 5.
79. Hagan & Peterson, supra note 29, at 26 ("[Flield studies of street prostitution
indicate that young minority women are routinely harassed by police, taken into custody
because they are 'known' prostitutes, and sometimes brutalized.").
80. Kay Levine & Virginia Mellema, Strategizing the Street: How Law Matters in the
Lives of Women in the Street-Level Drug Economy, 26 Law & Soc. Inquiry 169, 195-96
(2001).
81. Peter C. Hennigan, Property War: Prostitution, Red-Light Districts, and the
Transformation of Public Nuisance Law in the ProgressiveEra, 16 Yale J.L. & Human. 123,
125 (2004) (noting the existence of informal red-light districts in large and small cities
across the country prior to 1909).
82. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Flushing Goes on Patrol to Chase Off Prostitutes, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 22, 1992, at A43 (describing efforts of local residents in Queens and Harlem to
drive away prostitutes and customers because they were dissatisfied with the police response
to the problem); Thao Hua, Citizen Patrol Reclaims Crime-Ridden Boulevard, L.A. Times,
Dec. 26, 1995, at B1 (same); Mike Nichols, Quicker Police Response Sought, Milwaukee J.
Sentinel, Aug. 15, 1996, at 1 (documenting citizen complaints that "police have been slow in
responding" to influx of prostitutes and quoting one resident as saying, "I called (the police)
one time and they took two hours to come.... I am sick of this").
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communities have set up private police forces-surveillance teams, patrols,
and websites-to deter and punish prostitutes themselves. 83 Community
members who take law enforcement matters into their own hands do so in
84
recognition of the fact that the police function has failed them.
Underenforcement is thus a defining feature of prostitution, both in how
prostitution laws are put into practice and how they impact those who come
into contact with them. It is also a rich example of the potentially virulent
effects of underenforcement: It breeds police corruption, discrimination,
violence, victimization, and distrust. 85 It also suggests that traditional law
enforcement may be ill-equipped to handle illegal prostitution in an ethical
way, precisely because the pervasiveness of underenforcement leaves so
86
much room for dysfunction and error.
Prostitution is an enormous, pervasive socioeconomic institution.
Estimates of the number of sex workers range from 300,000 to one
million. 87 Customers number in the millions, including the majority of
American men, 88 and revenues number in the billions. 89 Prostitution
underenforcement practices thus distort how many individuals experience
the law in their most intimate, personal interactions. Underenforcement in

83. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 82 (describing community "prostitute patrol"); Chet
Fuller, Videotaping Posses Flush Out Criminals, Atlanta J. Const., Apr. 8, 1996, at A5
(describing resident videotaping of prostitutes in Boston, Los Angeles, and New York).
84. See David Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 89,
97 (2006) (describing how private policing is part of the "secession of the successful"
because it permits wealthy communities to opt out of expensive, ineffective public policing);
see also Sklansky, supra note 11, at 1818-23 (describing a trend toward private policing
adopted by wealthier communities and institutions).
85. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 574 (characterizing prostitution laws as having "two
typical results: non-enforcement coupled with graft, with the police using the prostitution
laws as devices for extracting payoffs, or enforcement targeted mostly at poor immigrant
neighborhoods").
Studies also suggest that prostitution is often a link in a chain of
victimization. See, e.g., Diane Mason, supra note 72 (reporting a Florida study finding that
nearly all prostitutes are victims of incest).
86. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 15, at 224 (considering the potential effect of
legalization on the improved enforcement of assault and other protective laws).
87. Michael Conant, Federalism, the Mann Act, and the Imperative to Decriminalize
Prostitution,5 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 99, 103 (1996) (estimating between 300,000 and
500,000 sex workers); SAGE Project, Standing Against Global Exploitation,
http://www.sageprojectinc.org/html/infobriefseffects.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006)
(estimating that "one million girls and women are in prostitution" and "at least 300,000 of
the individuals in prostitution in the U.S. are children" (citing JoAnn L. Miller, Prostitution
in Contemporary American Society, in Sexual Coercion: A Sourcebook on its Nature,
Causes, and Prevention 44 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski eds., 1991) and
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)).
88. Ellis E. Conklin, Expert Sets Record Straight on Dark Realities of Prostitution;
Conference an Eye-Openerfor County Social Workers, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 14,
1991, at BI (citing estimates that seventy percent of American men will visit a prostitute at
least once).
89. Conant, supra note 87, at 103 (estimating that revenues from prostitution are $20
billion (citing Carl Simon & Ann D. White, Beating the System: The Underground
Economy 249-55 (1982))).
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this realm injects concrete experiences of violence, legal failure, and
victimization into millions of American lives.
C. Undocumented Workers
Illegal immigration is a complex phenomenon that goes beyond mere
underenforcement, indeed well beyond the purview of the criminal law.
Nevertheless, like prostitution, the illegal immigration quandary is in part a
function of a disingenuous enforcement message sent by the government:
The underlying immigration prohibition is openly underenforced while
violators are penalized indirectly by the underenforcement of other legal
protections to which they are legally entitled. The government thus handles
both undocumented workers and prostitutes in part by rolling back the
carpet of the law, a scenario under which these two vulnerable classes of
workers suffer significant harms. Moreover, illegal immigration is for
many a paradigmatic example of the failure of the governmental
enforcement apparatus. It is thus briefly considered here as an illumination
of the workings of underenforcement.
There are currently nine million estimated undocumented immigrants in
the United States. 90 The underground economy in which they typically
work--"unregulated by the institutions of society"-represents nearly ten
percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. 9 1 Far from invisible,
undocumented immigrants work in manufacturing, construction,
restaurants, childcare, and individual homes. 92 They are employed by
major corporations and prominent political figures. 93 They pay tens of
94
billions of dollars in state and federal taxes.
At the heart of the undocumented worker phenomenon lies a tangle of
official practices involving the selective underenforcement of immigration,
labor, and criminal laws. Immigrants enter, live, and work in the United
States in violation of the law. 95 Immigrants are also victimized by
employers and workplace conditions that violate numerous workplace and
criminal laws. The underenforcement of these protective laws contributes

90. Jennifer Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights 1 (2005).
91. Id. at 47 (citing an International Monetary Fund study).

92. Id.
93. Helen Huntley, Illegal Hiring Goes on, Largely Unseen, St. Petersburg Times, Jan.
10, 2001, at 1A (noting that high-level nominations of Kimba Wood, Zoe Baird, and Linda
Chavez failed because they hired illegal immigrants).
94. See Karin Brulliard, Study: Immigrants Pay Tax Share, Wash. Post, June 5, 2006, at
B 1 (citing a study finding that illegal immigrants in the Washington D.C. area contributed $1
billion in taxes in 1999); Lourdes Medrano Leslie & Neal St. Anthony, Illegal Immigrants
Fuel State's Economy, Report Says, Minneapolis Star Trib., Sept. 7, 2000, at Dl (reporting a
study that found that the approximately 48,000 undocumented workers in the Minneapolis

area paid over $600 million in state, local, and federal taxes).
95. This description is not intended to downplay either the massive and expensive law
enforcement efforts to make border crossings more difficult or the suffering of immigrants
who are deported. It rather describes the reality that these efforts are ineffective at
preventing entry and re-entry.
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The first piece of the puzzle lies in the underenforcement of immigration
laws themselves. Government officials freely admit that the government
does not and cannot fully enforce immigration laws generally and that the
97
presence of illegal immigrants in U.S. society is a fact of life.
Immigration law also makes it illegal for employers to hire undocumented
workers, but immigration officials openly acknowledge that they do not
enforce these provisions, but rather that the government "turns a blind eye"
to immigration violations in the workplace. 98
Many argue that
notwithstanding the massive, expensive, and dangerous (to immigrants)
enforcement efforts to close the border, U.S. policy makers recognize
that
99
full enforcement of restrictive entry laws would harm the economy.
Workplaces are heavily regulated arenas, covered by wage and labor
standards, as well as health, safety, and antidiscrimination laws. Congress
has decreed and courts have held that the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
National Labor Relations Act, and Title VII apply to all workers, regardless
of their immigration status. 100 These laws, however, go underenforced as
well. Undocumented workers are typically paid subminimum wages in
unsafe working conditions, discriminated against based on their race and
language,1 and fired for exercising their rights or for joining or organizing
10
unions.

96. Undocumented status does not deprive immigrants of bedrock entitlements to due
process, equal protection, and other guarantees of basic lawfulness. See Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 213-15 (1982) ("[The illegal alien] is subject to the full range of obligations
imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction-either
voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United
States-he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to
establish.").
97. Lori A. Nessel, UndocumentedImmigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacyof Labor
Protectionand the Needfor Reform, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 345, 360 (2001); Rachel L.
Swams, Tough Border Security Bill Nears Passage in the House: Omits Guest Worker Plan
Urged by Bush, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2005, at A30 (noting the admissions of various
lawmakers); see also Stephen Dinan, Judge Tells Police to Lay Off Immigration
Enforcement, Wash. Times, Aug. 13, 2005, at A3 (reporting that a New Hampshire judge
forbade local police to enforce criminal trespass laws against illegal aliens after concluding
that immigration enforcement was a federal matter).
98. Louis Uchitelle, I.N.S. is Looking the Other Way as Illegal Immigrants Fill Jobs:
Enforcement Changes in Face of Labor Shortage, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2000, at Al (citing
Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics showing that arrests of undocumented
workers for deportation dropped to about 8600 in 1999 as compared with 22,000 two years
earlier).
99. See Swarns, supra note 97 (documenting business and political opposition to tougher
immigration worker controls).
100. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that undocumented
workers are protected by the National Labor Relations Act); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 86 (1973) (holding that undocumented workers are included within the meaning of
"employee" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
101. See Nessel, supra note 97. Local newspapers often document the abuse of
undocumented workers. See, e.g., Diane E. Lewis, 40 Immigrant Workers Fired After
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When law enforcement finally steps in, all too often it does so to protect
the interests of employers for whom the immigrant has become
inconvenient. Workers who file health and safety claims, attempt to collect
102
unpaid wages, or try to organize unions are subject to deportation.
Immigration officials acknowledge that when immigration laws are
enforced, they are enforced selectively: "[T]he only workers at risk of
deportation for unauthorized employment are those reported by the
employer in retaliation for protected organizing activities or 'that kind of
stuff.' ' 103 At least one appellate court has validated such practices by
declining to create an exclusionary rule, holding that information about
immigration status from employers in violation of labor laws can form a
10 4
basis for deportation.
These conditions have led observers to label such workplaces "lawless,"
not because they lack pertinent laws, but because those laws are openly and
officially flouted. 10 5 According to Jennifer Gordon, underenforcement is
central to the problem:
Thanks to decades of work by unions and reformers, most immigrant
workers, even the undocumented, have the right--on paper, at least-to a
minimum wage, to overtime wages, to protection from discrimination,
and to safe and healthy working conditions. Enforcing existing laws is
thus a major thrust of the current fight against sweatshops. Yet
sweatshops are founded on-are literally defined by-their refusal to
comply with.., basic laws governing the workplace. The underground
economy is structured to avoid detection ....
Compounding this is the fact that the government agencies responsible
for enforcing protective labor laws are sorely underfunded [and
106
understaffed].

Lawsuit Filed, Boston Globe, Dec. 23, 2004, at C3 (Brazilian workers fired after suing
roofing employer for failing to pay more than $1 million in overtime and wages).
102. See generally Nessel, supra note 97.
103. Id. at 361.
104. Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1997).
105. See Gordon, supranote 90, at 23.
106. Id. at 23-24. The phenomenon is not limited to small employers or sweatshops. See
M. Schacht et al., A 2004 Survey of 1,028 California Agricultural Workers Found
Widespread
Wage
and
Hour
Violations
(Jan.
2005),
available at
http://www.crlaf.org/2004CAWSWP.pdf (documenting widespread wage and hour
violations among California farm workers). Wal-Mart, the nation's largest retailer, recently
paid an $11 million settlement for its widespread practice of hiring undocumented workers at
subminimum wages to clean its facilities. According to one attorney, James L. Linsey, "at
least 250 illegal immigrants ... were employed by janitor contracting services and hired by
[Wal-Mart] in 21 states. Many of the janitors-from Mexico, Russia, Mongolia, Poland and
a host of other nations-worked seven days or nights a week without overtime pay or injury
compensation. . . . Those who worked nights were often locked in the store until the
morning." Wal-Mart Mops Up Immigrant Flap, CBSNews.com, Mar. 18, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/18/national/main681593.shtml; see also Rhonda
Cook, Smuggling of Immigrants is Continuing: Enforcement Lax; Economy Needs Workers,
Atlanta J. Const., Jan. 22, 2002, at D5 (documenting indictments of Tyson's Food executives
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Even where a government enforcement apparatus exists, it is often openly
10 7
hostile to immigrant workers.
Because of their alienation from legal and political institutions,
undocumented workers are substantially under-protected by criminal and
other laws. Such workers suffer indentured servitude, high rates of assault,
theft, rape, domestic violence, and homicide. 10 8 They experience open
The
sexual harassment, 10 9 race discrimination, and hate crimes. 110
neighborhoods in which they live are under-policed and often lack basic
Nonresident aliens, documented and
services and amenities.1 11
undocumented alike, report deep distrust of police, disrespect from police,
and a fear that they will be deported if they report crimes. While some
police departments recognize that they cannot play their traditional
112
protective role if they are perceived as immigration enforcers,
undocumented workers typically have strained relations with police and do
3
not receive the full protection of the criminal law. "1
for paying smugglers to bring illegal Mexican workers to jobs in nine Tyson plants in fifteen
states).
107. Gordon, supra note 90, at 25-26 ("Over and above these staffing problems,
immigrant workers in low wage industries hit brick walls when they tried to file claims with
Long Island labor enforcement offices. ...
Those who penetrated the translation system
were met with insult and outright rejection: inspectors told immigrants, 'I don't like to take
claims for domestic workers and restaurant workers,' lectured them about not paying taxes,
complained to them that 'illegal aliens' rob the taxpayers of money, and dissuaded them
from filing cases.").
108. See, e.g., Editorial, Smuggled Newcomers, Dallas Morning News, July 25, 1997, at
26A (relating how Chinese and Mexican illegal immigrants were held in involuntary
servitude subject to physical and sexual abuse); Greg Bloom, Frontera NorteSur, El Paso
Monitoring
Project,
Nov.
2000,
Immigrant
Law
Enforcement
http://www.nmsu.edu/-frontera/nov00/feat3.html (relating how "undocumented women
residing near the border in Texas are often afraid to call the police in situations of domestic
violence.., because Border Patrol often ride with local law-enforcement agents").
109. See, e.g., Amanda Clark, A Hometown Dilemma: Addressing the Sexual Harassment
of Undocumented Women in Meatpacking Plants in Iowa and Nebraska, 16 Hastings
Women's L.J. 139 (2004).
110. See, e.g., Interview by In Motion Magazine with Roberto Martinez, Dir., U.S./Mex.
Border Program and Immigration Law Enforcement Monitoring Project of the Am. Friends
at
Serv.
Comm.
(July
7,
2001),
available
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/hrcr/rm200la.html (describing how "groups of white
kids in pickup trucks... shoot[] at migrants as they cross the border"); Patrick McDonnell,
Crime and Violence Against Illegal Crossers PromptsPromise of More Patrols,L.A. Times,
June 14, 1990, at B 1 (documenting pervasive violence including murder against immigrants
crossing the border).
11. See supra Part I.A.
112. See Karen Brandon, U.S. Weighs Local Role on Immigration, Chicago Trib., Apr.
14, 2002, at AI0 (quoting a police chief saying that "'[i]t would be virtually impossible to
[fight crime] effectively if witnesses and victims, no matter what their residency status, had
some reluctance to come forward for fear of being deported'); Michael Riley, Immigration
Bill Has Police Uneasy, Denver Post, Apr. 22, 2002, at Al (quoting a police chief saying
that .'[c]ommunication is big in inner-city neighborhoods and the underpinning of that is
trust....
If a victim thinks they're going to be a suspect (in an immigration violation),
they're not going to call us, and that's just going to separate us even further."').
113. See, e.g., Solomon Moore, LAPD Enlisted in Fight on Human Smuggling, L.A.
Times, Jan. 25, 2005, at B1 (documenting lax enforcement and revealing that the federal
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The underenforcement of criminal, labor, and public welfare laws is thus
a defining fingerprint of the conflicted relationship that the U.S. legal
system has with these workers and residents. This "zone" reveals that
underenforcement is also selective enforcement: Here it operates as a
subsidy to the illegal conduct of the industries and employers who rely on
undocumented workers. At the same time, it devalues those workers' rights
and dignitary interests by tolerating their economic and personal
victimization in violation of existing laws. The combination of selective
enforcement, widespread victimization, and open, official disdain for a wide
array of laws results in a violent, lawless atmosphere.
D. Reversing Underenforcement: Domestic Violence
The domestic violence reform movement offers a telling example of how
underenforcement can become publicly recognized-and challenged-as a
form of social disadvantage and dismissal. Prior to such reform movements
of the 1970s and 1980s, domestic violence was an arena of widespread
public underenforcement. Police routinely declined to intervene in what
was deemed a private family matter.
In response, reform efforts specifically aimed at eliminating
underenforcement and ensuring that police and prosecutors enforced
existing laws. Two staples of this effort were mandatory arrest rules and
no-drop prosecution policies-in effect, the curtailing of police and
prosecutorial authority to underenforce the law." 4 As a result of these
reform efforts, not only are domestic violence laws more routinely and
vigorously enforced today, but far greater legal resources are devoted to the
1 15
domestic violence issue.
Domestic violence reform highlights the normative and distributional
power of official underenforcement. Central to the reform argument was
the understanding that underenforcement of domestic violence offenses
represents a form of male favoritism, an implicit devaluation of women, and
the authorization of male violence against them.' 16 Fuller enforcement of
antiviolence laws thus serves a vital function, not merely of physical
protection, but of value reversal, in which the state steps in to protect
female victims and revises traditional male violent prerogatives. Such
challenges to underenforcement are not merely raw demands for law
enforcement resources, but more fundamentally for changes in the culture

government filed only twelve human trafficking cases in 2003 and only ten in both 2002 and
2001 even though the problem is widespread).
114. See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence,
and the Conservatizationof the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 237, 239-41

(2005).

115. Lisae C. Jordan, Introduction to Special Issue on Domestic Violence, 39 Fam. L.Q.
1, 1-2 (2005) (documenting increased programs and expenditures on domestic violence).
116. See, e.g., Miccio, supra note 114, at 240 ("[M]andatory arrest provisions.., placed
male intimate violence at the center of law enforcement policy by criminalizing conduct that
the justice system and society previously had sanctioned.").
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of acceptance, a new assertion that the failure to enforce certain laws is an
unacceptable social practice.
The domestic violence debate also highlights a recurring theme in
underenforcement, which is that traditional law enforcement is not a cureall for crime. Even in the face of stepped-up enforcement, intimate violence
against women remains pervasive, and there is growing evidence that law
enforcement intervention may itself exacerbate such violence or give rise to
other forms of discrimination. 117 Like urban policing of disorder and
prostitution, domestic violence policy is conflicted over the enforcement
question: It has not yet answered the threshold question of the proper role
of law enforcement or figured out the extent to which traditional law
enforcement methods provide a meaningful solution to intimate violence.
The domestic violence debate does, however, illustrate the centrality of
underenforcement within this larger debate: It is precisely by considering
the extent to which we should tolerate underenforcement that we gain
insight into the deeper problem of the appropriate relationship between the
criminal law and individual destructive behavior.
E. Positive Faces of Underenforcement: The Internetand Civil
Disobedience
The four preceding examples reveal that official underenforcement can
be a form of unequal distribution of resources and official disrespect for
under-protected groups. But underenforcement can also be a form 1of
18
nonintervention or deference to nongovernmental decision makers.
When law enforcement recedes to leave room for individual autonomy,
creativity, or the expression of democratic challenges to authority, it can be
an important ingredient in maintaining freedom of the public sphere. At the
far end of the spectrum, underenforcement may delineate the proper balance
between state coercive authority and individual freedom.

117. See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A CriticalReview, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 801 (2001) (challenging mandatory law
enforcement policies as anti-feminist); Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to
"Straighten Out" Criminal Law: What Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice
Meet CriminalLaw's Conventional Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. Cal. Rev. L. &

Women's Stud. 81, 85 (2003) (arguing that mainstream feminist concepts of gender and
sexuality are too narrow and impede the protection of same-sex couples and generally
weaken domestic violence law); Jennifer C. Nash, From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black
Women, and Feminist Legal Theory, 11 Cardozo Women's L.J. 303, 317-18 (2005)

(recognizing that the underenforcement of domestic violence laws harms women generally
even while arguing that aggressive mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution rules may
disproportionately harm women of color).
118. See generally Wayne A. Logan, CriminalLaw Sanctuaries, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.

Rev. 321 (2003) (criticizing governmental respect for and resulting nonintervention into
church, corporate, and family zones as misplaced deference and a failure to enforce criminal
law).
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1. Intellectual Property Rights on the Internet
Perhaps nowhere has the liberating, creative potential of
underenforcement been more celebrated than in connection with the
Internet. As scholars have long pointed out, the sheer size and fluidity of
the Internet makes enforcement of copyright and other traditional property
laws difficult, if not impossible. 1 19
As Lawrence Lessig puts it,
"[c]yberspace is the single largest location of violations of intellectual
property precepts of any place in human history."' 2 0 Of course, copyright
holders are not the only potential victims of Internet crime: The FBI's
high-profile effort to police child pornography is a testament to the
difficulty of enforcing conventional laws in the virtual world of electronic
communication. 12 1 For the purposes of this analysis, however, the value of
the example flows not from the government's inefficacy but from the
various meanings attributed to underenforcement, and the impact of those
enforcement choices on the shape of cyberspace itself.
Lessig, among others, argues that in the cyberspace context,
underenforcement is a good thing, preservative of freedom and liberty and
the original promise of Internet creativity. Such scholars emphasize that
enforcement is not neutral executive activity but a thumb on the scales of an
undecided issue, to wit, the nature of virtual intellectual property rights in
the first place. 122 In this context, the official choice to over- or under-police
is subject as much to democratic pressures as technological ones and
reflects governmental responsiveness to competing, legitimate claims over
123
the Internet.
The debate over Internet underenforcement also reveals the factual
sensitivity of the underenforcement question. While there is no upside to
the underenforcement of homicide laws, there may be strong arguments for
the underenforcement of other kinds of prohibitions, depending on whom
they disadvantage and whom they protect. Under such circumstances, the
political process of allocating the valuable resource of law enforcement can
be a useful and appropriate vehicle for mediating those competing, highly
contested claims.
The Internet example also reveals how nonenforcement choices can
affirmatively shape the nature of the spaces they regulate. Lessig's

119. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in

Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996).
120. Lawrence Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 337, 343

(2000).
121. Susan W. Brenner, Toward a CriminalLaw for Cyberspace: Product Liability and
Other Issues, 8 U. Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 1, 48-49 & nn.188-89 (2005).

122. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 29, 30-32
(2005) (describing the debate among "Internet exceptionalists").
123. See Edward K. Cheng, StructuralLaws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100

Nw. U. L. Rev. 655, 714-15 (2006) (arguing that congressional prohibitions against music
downloading represent a political compromise between music producers who want strong
prohibitions and the electronics industry that benefits from underenforcement).
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argument for Internet underenforcement is a structural one: He does not
assert that government should enforce the law less vigorously, but rather
that government Internet enforcement is a function of the way the Internet is
structured in the first place. 124 The idea is that the very architecture of
cyberspace-its "code"---can either establish government control or impede
it and that underlying codes will effectively determine the extent of
25
individual freedom and privacy.1
Lessig's argument about the architecture of control has resonance for
underenforcement in more conventional criminal law settings, as Lessig
himself points out.1 26 The insight-that enforcement practices reflect not
just individual official decisions but the publicly chosen structures of
cyberspace--could apply equally to public housing, prostitution districts, or
sweatshops. In each of these "spaces," enforcement decisions and control
mechanisms reflect how those spaces are-legally and socially constructed.
A growing literature on legal -boundaries, criminogenic spaces and the
social construction of identity likewise recognize the significance of such
architectural choices. 127 On this view, underenforcement is not merely a
paucity of police on the streets or FBI agents trolling the Internet. Rather,
underenforcement is a combination of public value judgments, resource
allocations, structural choices about how public spaces function, and, most
importantly, the power of residents of those spaces to make their demands
heard.
2. Civil Disobedience
Sometimes lawbreaking embodies broader values: free speech, political
protest, public debate, and the ability of citizens to challenge the
government. 128 When it does, the underenforcement of criminal laws

124. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999)

(advocating "digital commons" and warning against government and corporate attempts to
control cyberspace).
125. See id. at 6-8 (arguing that code ownership leads to control of cyberspace and the
demise of Internet privacy and freedom). Specifically, Lessig argues that ownership of the
code leads inexorably to governmental and private control, and that only "free" or "open
source" code can provide the "structural guarantee of constitutionalized liberty" that can
maintain freedom and privacy on the Internet. Id. at 7, 224.
126. Lessig points out similarities between his work and that of Tracey Meares, who
argues that the social architecture of the inner-city community shapes law enforcement
effectiveness far more than individual police decisions. Id. at 94.
127. See generally Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional
Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1365 (1997); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Architecture as Crime Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1039 (2002) (arguing that physical architecture
plays an important role in crime control); see also Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great
American Cities (1993).
128. Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 Yale L.J. 1897, 1898-99 (2005)
(describing classic theories of liberal civil disobedience in which civil disobedience marks a

boundary between individual expression and state authority); see also id. at 1903 (arguing
that democratic disobedience as a form of protest and political participation enhances
democracy).
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reflects a broader social commitment to a public space that is not fully
occupied or controlled by government. Although protesters often violate
trespass, loitering, and other criminal laws, police routinely do not fully
enforce these laws, opting for symbolic or partial enforcement in the spirit
of the expressive nature of the protest. 129 We take it as a sign of social
maturity that police do not fully enforce criminal laws against protesters,
and we fear for our democracy when protesting lawbreakers are treated like
traditional criminals without regard for the expressive or First Amendment
values at stake. 130 In this context, underenforcement is a sign of truly
responsive government, one that recognizes that not all laws deserve to be
enforced all of the time and that principles of democratic accountability
sometimes require law enforcement to make room for public deviance.
Of course, one group's freedom may be another's shackles, and neither
the Internet nor the civil disobedience examples are one-sided. Copyright
and license holders see themselves as victims of underenforcement, 13 1 and
civil disobedience likewise has its costs. For example, some argue that the
permissive and anti-law enforcement culture of the anti-Vietnam and civil
rights movements eroded public safety and even the moral fabric of the
nation. 132 The point is not to deny the existence of victimization, but to
recognize that law enforcement sensitivity to competing values may
properly result in the underenforcement of existing criminal laws.
The examples described above illustrate the power-laden, normative,
constitutive nature of underenforcement. They are also the tip of the
iceberg. U.S. society is rife with underenforcement practices. They include
official tolerance of personal drug use, 133 medical marijuana, gay sex prior
to Lawrence v. Texas, 134 illegal gun ownership, 135 illegal hunting
129. Protests in which no arrests are made are common. See, e.g., Michael Slackman &
Ann Farmer, 25,000 Abortion-Rights Advocates March to City Hall, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29,

2004, at A27 (noting that no arrests were made in a half-mile long procession).
130. See Kareem Fahim, Civil Liberty Report Assails Police Over 2004 Protests, N.Y.

Times, Aug. 31, 2005, at B2 (describing citywide outrage at police treatment of protestors at
the Republican National Convention); see also Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 105
(1985) ("Americans accept that civil disobedience has a legitimate if informal place in the
political culture of their community."); Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and
the FirstAmendment, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 67, 68 (1990) ("[Even when not protected by the
First Amendment,] civil disobedience nevertheless has become an established part of
American political life.").
131. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345, 1349 (2004) ("[Copyright holders]

see themselves as under threat from a flood of cheap, easy copies and a dramatic increase in
the number of people who can make those copies.")..
132. See Markovits, supra note 128, at 1898 (noting that sometimes "political
disobedience risks becoming itself a form of oppression, in which protesters attempt
improperly to impose their personal political preferences upon others").
133. See Barnett, supra note 68, at 426 (describing the "chronic underenforcement of vice
laws" and arguing that minimal enforcement plus strong public education best preserves
general normative commitments to anti-drug behavior).
134. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Just because a law is symbolic or rarely enforced does not
render it toothless. See Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws,
Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 643 (2001) (arguing that unenforced
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accidents, 136 and a host of others. Each example reflects a complex set of
public policies, social norms, and governmental decisions that give rise to
the unique expectations and understandings of the civilians and law
enforcement officials who populate these zones. Because of this diversity,
the normative significance of underenforcement practices can only be
discerned contextually and empirically by looking at the values served and
at who is protected or harmed by the practices. Or, as David Sklansky puts
it in a slightly different context, "[t]he presence of this redistributive
dimension [to policing] makes it particularly important, from a democratic
perspective, to identify the beneficiaries of particular forms of policing.
Whether the redistribution at issue advances or retards the cause of antiinegalitarianism will depend on who stands to win and who stands to
37
lose."1
II. SOURCES AND EFFECTS: DIAGNOSING UNDERENFORCEMENT

Some underenforcement practices are unfair, undemocratic, and harmful;
others may be empowering, responsive, and helpful. But what, exactly,
makes them so? Are there objective, identifiable characteristics of "bad"
underenforcement that distinguish it from the "good"?
Drawing from the examples in Part I, Part II attempts to evaluate which
forms of underenforcement are democratically or otherwise troublesome,
and which are not. Part II categorizes underenforcement practices by their
"sources" and "effects," and considers which sorts of sources and effects
consistently pose fairness, accountability, and efficacy problems.
To be clear, the "source and effect" approach is just one possible way of
parsing the question. 138 But it is appealing because it borrows an important
insight from the familiar terrain of antidiscrimination law and its distinction
sodomy laws nevertheless cause lesbians and gays to self-police and otherwise powerfully
shape social understanding and tolerance of homosexuality).
135. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 186 n.l (1998) (quoting congressional
findings that "there is a widespread traffic in firearms moving in or otherwise affecting
interstate or foreign commerce. .. [and] that the ease with which any person can acquire
firearms... (including criminals, juveniles ... [,] narcotics addicts, mental defectives,
armed groups... [,] and others whose possession of such weapons is similarly contrary to
the public interest) is a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime
in the United States"); see also Fox Butterfield, Study Exposes Illegal Traffic in New Guns:
Licensed Dealers Sell Many Used in Crimes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1999, at A22 (reporting
on a government study indicating that "large numbers of new guns are being sold illegally").
136. See generally John F. Decker, Don't Forget to Wear Your Hunter Orange (or Flack
Jacket): A Critiqueon the Lack of Criminal Prosecution of Hunting "Accidents," 56 S.C. L.
Rev. 135 (2004) (documenting the pervasive lack of prosecution of hunting accidents that
harm or kill the victim even where there is evidence of recklessness or other fault on the part
of the hunter).
137. Sklansky, supra note 11, at 1822-23.
138. For example, underenforcement could be sorted by the intent of the public policy-

maker; the nature of the underlying law; the "zone" in which the underenforcement occurs;
the identity of the official making the decision (police, prosecutor, legislative funding
decision, etc.); or the kinds of victims it leaves behind. The "source and effect" framework
accounts for some but not all of these factors.
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between discriminatory intent and disparate impact. That body of law both
acknowledges that there is something especially pernicious about
intentional, hostile, official action directed against individuals and groups,
while at the same time recognizing that public policies may have
unacceptable effects even when they do not flow from any identifiable
official intent. The dichotomy thus allows us simultaneously to distinguish
between the hostile or benign official intentions behind underenforcement,
even while criticizing the unintended effects of these practices. The effect
inquiry, in particular, permits appreciation of the experiences of
underenforcement victims: their loss of personal security, their sense of
government unresponsiveness, and their devalued relationship to the law
itself.

139

A. Sources

Underenforcement can be a result of intentional, official hostility towards
specific victim groups: racial minorities, for example, or undocumented
workers or prostitutes. This hostility can take numerous forms, from public
policies that openly discriminate against these groups by failing to protect
them, to the personal biases of individual enforcement officers that lead to
inaction. Allegations of such intentional discrimination underlie the
Modesto lawsuit described above 140 and are often implicit in allegations of
14 1
under-funding of urban policing and other services.
Intentional, official hostility towards specific victim groups is the most
problematic source of underenforcement. When the government's hostility
is based on race or some other impermissible criteria, of course, it
constitutes an equal protection violation. 142 But even when the group is not
139. Admittedly, enforcement practices impact individuals in so many different ways that
characterizing the "effect" or harmfulness of any such practice is potentially quite subjective.
See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle,90 J. Cim. L. & Criminology
109, 113 (1999) ("Claims of harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has
become meaningless: the harm principle no longer serves the function of a criticalprinciple
because non-trivial harm arguments permeate the debate."). It is, however, arguably no less
so than the wide range of current literature that attempts to identify the expressive,
normative, or psychological "effects" of criminal laws and practices. See, e.g., Stephanos
Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85, 114-15 (2004) (arguing that additional procedures for
expressing remorse in criminal sentencing would improve defendant rehabilitation and
victim satisfaction); Meares & Kahan, supra note 35, at 21 (arguing that when "residents of
the inner city ... are free to adopt or approve [more vigorous policing]" it enhances their
"healthy democratic political life" which in turn reduces "atomization and distrust").
140. See supra note 49.
141. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 20 ("[R]acist discrimination by law enforcement
officers has often played a role in creating the conditions that make blacks more vulnerable
than whites to destructive criminality."); see also id. at 72 ("[T]here does exist a kernel of
truth in the general complaint that... networks of decisionmakers [including] legislators...
respond differently-more attentively-when whites rather than blacks are victimized by
crime or other injurious activity.").
142. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3
(1989) ("The State may not.., selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored
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entitled to heightened protection, the purposeful withholding of law
enforcement resources due to official dislike offends concepts of neutrality
at the heart of rule of law. While the rule-of-law argument is explored in
greater depth below, 143 at the very least it embodies the idea that the
protections of the law should not be subject to the personal biases of law
enforcement officials.
Underenforcement can also result from the political system's general
tendency to under-serve the politically weak, by failing to allocate resources
and attention. This underenforcement is marked not so much by overt,
intentional hostility as indifference, although in practice the two are often
intimately related. 144 The result is the inability of these groups to gain
attention and responsiveness from their political representatives and
institutions. As described above, this would include police indifference to
crimes in urban areas, or to prostitutes' and undocumented workers'
victimization.
In a similar vein, underenforcement may result from the intersection of
political weakness with increased need: Some communities need more law
enforcement resources but are in a politically poor position to obtain them.
As Stuntz points out, poor high-crime communities effectively require law
enforcement subsidies from richer, lower-crime communities, an
arrangement nearly guaranteed to lead to under-funding in poor
45
neighborhoods. 1
The mere fact that the political process distributes law enforcement
resources unequally does not, alone, make those distributions illegitimate.
Interest group jockeying typically leads to unequal distributions, and law
enforcement funding in that sense is not unique. The fact that some
communities have greater need does not, without more, render such
allocations suspect either; indeed the government's failure to meet the needs
of the disadvantaged is a quintessential issue of political distribution in
which the Supreme Court has been careful not to intervene. 14 6 This does
not mean that all political distributions are acceptable. Rather, it is merely
to note that the political system tends to distribute resources unequally and
that this fact of life should not, by itself, invalidate the outcome of that
process.
Conversely, underenforcement can represent a form of favoritism
towards powerful offender groups, such as corporate wrongdoers or church
officials. 147 New Republican or Democratic administrations may soft-pedal
minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause."); see also Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
143. See supra Part 1II.B.I.

144. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect-Race, Crime, and Punishment in
America 4-7 (1995).
145. See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 10-12 (arguing that state and federal funding should be
devoted to remedying this imbalance).
146. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (citing abortion and housing cases in which the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to intervene).
147. Logan, supra note 118.
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laws passed by previous Congresses, while local law enforcement agencies
may decline to enforce state or national laws against targets for whom they
have sympathy.' 4 8 There is typically disagreement over whether such
underenforcement decisions represent undemocratic sabotage or a healthy
expression of the system of checks and balances,49and the courts leave such
favoritism to resolution by the political process. 1
Underenforcement also occurs when the class of offenders is large and
the underlying offenses are perceived as minor. As Margaret Raymond has
pointed out, law enforcement may be reluctant to divert resources toward
offenses such as underage drinking or speeding; there may even be a social
150
consensus that full enforcement of such laws would be unreasonable.
More dramatically, underenforcement can also indicate that the underlying
law itself is morally contested, such as assisted suicide or medical
marijuana use, in which law enforcement lassitude may reflect a lack of
general social consensus about whether to criminalize the underlying
behavior at all. Such underenforcement is a form of responsiveness to
social demands and therefore cannot be easily repudiated, even though it
undermines the strength and uniformity of the law as written.
More generally, the structural overbreadth of the law itself naturally
generates underenforcement.
Broad criminal codes guarantee
underenforcement, simply because the law offers the police and prosecutors
many options and does not anticipate full enforcement.' 5 1
The
underenforcement of a particular crime may reflect the availability of
proxies--comparable offenses that can be more easily prosecuted1 52-or
civil remedies.' 53 For some laws, the sheer scale of the enforcement task
148. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Causing Death for CompassionateReasons in American

Law, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 693, 694 (2006) (stating that despite the existence of thousands of
assisted-suicide cases "[o]nly rarely do prosecutors choose to initiate legal proceedings");
Dean E. Murphy, CaliforniaPatrol Won 't Seize Marijuana Used as Medicine, N.Y. Times,

Aug. 30, 2005, at A15 (describing local law enforcement's "hands-off' position even in the
face of federal criminalization of medical marijuana).
149. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745 (2005)
(describing how local decision makers can wield state power on behalf of minority
positions). My thanks to Nestor Davidson for this larger point.
150. Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1395, 1400 nn.16-18
(2002) (identifying speeding, public drunkenness in university towns, and underage drinking
as crimes which are widely violated by otherwise law-abiding people in ways that both
public and police accept as appropriate).
151. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretexual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 613 (2005)

(describing how the "extreme disjunction between federal jurisdiction and federal resources
has bred a norm of radical underenforcement").
152. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 123; Stuntz, supra note 1. But see Richman & Stuntz,
supra note 151, at 587 (criticizing federal prosecutors' tendency to substitute pretextual
offenses in order to ease prosecution).
153. Darryl K. Brown, who examines the underenforcement of white-collar criminal
laws, argues that underenforcement often reflects an official conclusion that alternative,
noncriminal methods are more effective enforcement mechanisms.
He interprets
"[w]idespread declination," i.e., failure to enforce criminal laws, as embodying a tradeoff
between criminal and civil penalties. Brown, supra note 8, at 1296. In other words, he
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makes full enforcement literally impossible. In the above examples of drug
enforcement, prostitution, and Internet copyright enforcement, the
magnitude of the enforcement task guarantees some level of
underenforcement. The impossibility of full enforcement has garnered
scholarly attention: Several scholars have identified the systemic harms to
rule of law, accountability, and transparency that flow from such
overbreadth. 154 On the other hand, they also acknowledge that some
overbreadth-and
therefore underenforcement-is
inevitable and
55
sometimes unobjectionable.1
Finally, underenforcement can flow from institutional or historical
factors: differences in federal and state law enforcement jurisdiction or
priorities, police training or familiarity with new or complex laws, or
technological advances to which the law has not yet caught up. 156 And, of
course, the underenforcement of any particular law is likely to be the result
of multiple forces. 157 In sum, underenforcement is built into many basic
features of the criminal system: political competition over policing
resources, overbroad codes, and decentralized executive control over the
enforcement of generally applicable laws. While official hostility towards
victim groups casts a shadow over the legitimacy of the resulting
underenforcement practices, these other sources are harder to categorize. In
general, they suggest that extremely harmful underenforcement can often
occur for a combination of routine, structural, or even benign reasons.
B. Effects: In Search of Harm Principles
The most obvious harmful effect of underenforcement is that it leaves
victims unprotected. Not only does it permit individual victimization, but
systemic underenforcement contributes to the creation of recognizable
classes of victims and entrenched patterns of victimization. 158

assumes that the failure to enforce criminal laws against white-collar offenders means that
some other governmental enforcement mechanism has been deployed. Id. at 1312-14
(describing the alternative enforcement mechanisms that substitute for white-collar criminal
prosecutions).
154. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 151, at 585-87; see also Luna, supra note 1, at 717.
155. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 151, at 612, 623-24; see also Luna, supra note 37, at
535 (recognizing the impossibility of full enforcement).
156. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online
Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 371,

433 (2006) (discussing a proposed House bill and concluding that "[b]ecause of the nature of
the Internet, legislative attempts to prohibit Internet gambling are unlikely to be effective").
157. See supra Part I.B (indicating that police under-protection of prostitutes flows from a
combination of hostility, indifference, corruption, the lack of self-reporting, and the scale of
the prostitution phenomenon).
158. See e.g., Gordon, supra note 90. at 15-16 (stating that undocumented workers
experience higher levels of workplace injury and death); Kennedy, supra note 9, at 19-20
(noting that black men are homicide victims at higher rates than any other population group);
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 191 (2002), available
at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/sb2002/sb2002-section3.pdf (revealing in Table
3.4 that African-American rape rates are three times that of whites).
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Underenforcement is not, of course, the sole cause of such high levels of
victimization. Rather, the examples above reveal more precisely how
official underenforcement practices contribute to these victimization
patterns.
Underenforcement can also create or reinforce certain forms of material
disadvantage. As described above, 159 underenforcement in inner cities is a
form of social disinvestment that contributes not only to crime, but also to
other forms of social decay. High nonenforcement rates can depress
property values, impede economic opportunity, reduce the quality of life in
0
neighborhoods and schools, and stimulate middle-class flight.16
Underenforcement has expressive effects:
It can validate private
violence and lawbreaking by others or send an official message of dismissal
and devaluation. 16 1 Domestic violence activists have long pointed out that
inattention to battered women validates male violence. 162 Similarly, the
under-protection of socially vulnerable groups can be a form of
discrimination, or an invitation to violence, hate crimes, or other forms of
civic terrorism. 163 As Randall Kennedy put it a decade ago, "[d]eliberately
withholding protection against criminality.., is one of the most destructive
forms of oppression that has been visited upon African-Americans."' 164 Ten
years earlier, Catharine MacKinnon described the law's disregard for
crimes against women as a form of sex discrimination: "[r]ape, battery,
sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children, prostitution, and
pornography .... These abuses are as allowed de facto as they are
prohibited de jure."' 16 5 Such instances of systemic underenforcement are
forms of official subordination and deprivation precisely because the state
tolerates illegal harms against vulnerable groups that, for more favored
constituents, would be intolerable.

159. See supra Part I.A.
160. See supra Part I. Underenforcement of certain crimes may also exacerbate racial

segregation. One study found that high robbery rates stimulated white flight from suburban
communities, thereby increasing the concentration of black residents. Allen E. Liska, John
R. Logan & Paul E. Bellair, Race and Violent Crime in the Suburbs, 63 Am. Soc. Rev. 27,
28 (1998).
161. See, e.g., Peter C. Yeager, Law, Crime, and Inequality: The Regulatory State, in

Crime and Inequality 247, 268 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) ("To the public
mind, enforcement is the centerpiece of legal regulation, whether for conventional criminal
offenses or for business infractions. Both symbolically and practically, enforcement is the
capstone, a final indicator of the state's seriousness of purpose ....
); id. (arguing more
generally that the state's failure to enforce environmental laws sheds light on the law's
efficacy and fairness).

162. See supra Part I.D.
163. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1431-35
(1992) (arguing that anti-sodomy laws constitute official legitimation of homophobic
violence and thus violate a constitutional principle of "corporal integrity" located in the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
164. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 29.
165. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 5
(1987).
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Underenforcement can also have a devastating normative impact on those
who live in underenforcement zones. Underenforcement weakens the
expectations of individuals that the law will protect them from violators or
that (from the violators' perspective) the law will intervene in their
wrongdoing.
In underenforcement zones, criminal proscriptions are
weakened by their open underenforcement. Inner-city residents, prostitutes,
and undocumented workers each express some version of the perception
that police departments are equivalent to gangs-that they are unprincipled,
biased, and unreliable. 166 For these individuals, enforcement failures not
only weaken the force of anti-victimization laws, but also erode their belief
in and commitment to law-abiding norms and the legal system itself.
The criminal-law-and-social-norms movement, led by Dan Kahan and
Tracey Meares, implicitly recognizes these normative harms of
underenforcement. 16 7 It does so in its central contention that law
enforcement practices should be evaluated in light of the messages that they
send to residents and that less-than-vigorous law enforcement-through, for
168
example, the curtailment of police power through criminal procedure sends the inappropriate message that crime is tolerable. 169 "Broken
windows" or zero-tolerance policing efforts likewise rely on the same
intuition: that the tolerance of petty criminality sends destructive messages
70
about the extent to which disorder will be officially tolerated. 1
Under other circumstances, underenforcement can have positive, even
empowering effects. As discussed above, underenforcement of Internet

166. See supra Part I.
167. See generally Meares & Kahan, supra note 35.
168. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo. L.J. 1153 (1998) (arguing that criminal procedure is
overextended and interferes with crime control).
169. Margaret Raymond similarly argues that the underenforcement even of petty crimes
that no one thinks should be fully enforced-such as speeding and underage drinkingcauses harmful normative dissonance because it undermines compliance norms, breeds
disorder, and promotes duplicity in law enforcement. Raymond, supra note 150.
170. See, e.g., Wilson & Kelling, supra note 53. This is not to assume that "broken
windows" and "zero tolerance" policing have correctly diagnosed the source of crime, but
merely to note that they recognize the potential normative harms of underenforcement. The
empirical literature has been unable to establish the effectiveness of broken windows or zero
tolerance policing. Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence
from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 271 (2006)
(finding that increased misdemeanor arrests correlated with an increase in crime). Compare
Wilson & Kelling, supra note 53 (noting that increased misdemeanor arrests reduced violent
crime), with Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 55, at 608 (finding that disorder policing
does not reduce crime and that disorder should be understood as flowing from the same
sources as crime rather than as an independent cause). The impact of policing all forms of
crime is complex-arresting more people does not necessarily reduce crime. See Jeffrey
Fagan et al., The Bustle of Horses in a Ship: Drug Controlin New York City Public Housing
19-20 (Columbia Law School Pub. Research Paper No. 05-89, Aug. 30, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-716821 (finding that while some forms of localized patrol in public
housing decreased crime precinct-wide, they had no discernable effects on the actual housing
projects being policed, and that, moreover, increased drug arrests were associated with
increased homicides, potentially as a result of destabilized drug markets).
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property laws enhances creativity and the development of new technologies,
while the underenforcement of criminal laws in the face of civil
17
disobedience can promote political discourse and change. 1
Because underenforcement of criminal laws leaves room for alternative
responses, it can also increase other social benefits.172 Darryl Brown points
out that white-collar criminal law has a long tradition of constructive
underenforcement in which the government relies on alternative civil
sanctions as a means of improving corporate compliance, ensuring
corporate survival, and other utilitarian benefits. 173 He argues that
comparable underenforcement in the realm of street crime, coupled with
alternative sanctions, could likewise produce better compliance and less
recidivism. Drug court and restorative justice models likewise implicitly
advocate underenforcement of traditional criminal sanctions on the theory
that mental health and substance abuse treatment, social shaming, and other
74
alternative sanctions offer greater benefits. 1
Underenforcement can have the additional effect of strengthening trust
between individuals and the state. In his discussion of corporate sanctions,
Brown describes how the withholding of criminal sanctions can facilitate
ongoing "trust [and] cooperation" between businesses and the
government. 175 Similarly, the old-fashioned street-policing model revolves
heavily around the ideas that the beat cop with good relationships with local
individuals will not always enforce the letter of the law and that this form of
underenforcement strengthens trust and ties between police and
176
community.

Finally, as noted above, underenforcement can have the effect of
validating competing values, sending the message that free speech, political
activism, or individual autonomy are more important than the routine
enforcement of criminal laws. 177 Some such validations can, of course, be
negative, especially when they leave competing interests unprotected.
Wayne Logan, for example, documents and criticizes the historical
underenforcement of proscriptions against crime occurring within families,
corporations, and the church as an unwarranted subsidy to male-head-ofhousehold, corporate, and religious interests. 178 Nevertheless, as Logan
also recognizes, underenforcement can be a positive expression of

171. See supra Part I.E.1.

172. Evaluating the economic benefits of underenforcement of different sorts of rules is a
long-standing theme in contract law. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing
Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 Yale L.J. 235

(1995).
173. Brown, supra note 8, at 1312-14.
174. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Introduction to The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003

Utah L. Rev. I (describing the restorative justice movement).
175. Brown, supra note 8, at 1352 (arguing that such results are replicated in drug courts).
176. Id.; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part I.E.2.
178. See Logan, supra note 118.
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governmental restraint in the face of competing values and individual or
79
institutional autonomy.
These positive examples reveal underenforcement as a potential form of
responsiveness and a welcome alternative to punitive harshness.
In
exposing the potential for positive underenforcement, the examples embody
the recognition that traditional criminal sanctions may be heavy-handed and
ineffectual and that the criminal law should recede in the face of other
options for social control. Responsive underenforcement can have the
effect of empowering and benefiting the individuals at issue: enhancing
their dignity, independence, and potential for growth that criminal
intervention might stifle or destroy.
C. Diagnosing Underenforcement
This Article shows that not all sources of underenforcement are facially
suspect, nor are all effects of underenforcement harmful. Rather, the
discussion suggests five triggering factors by which to distinguish
unobjectionable or even positive forms of underenforcement from those that
should trigger concern and reform.
These factors are (1) official
discriminatory intent, (2) group disadvantage, (3) interference with basic
life functions, (4) undermining civilian relations with law enforcement, and
(5) the lack of countervailing values. 180
First, when public officials intentionally discriminate against socially
vulnerable groups by withholding legal protection, as discussed above, it
constitutes a form of discrimination and taints the neutrality of the law
itself. Intentional discrimination also famously triggers concerns about the
power. 18
majoritarian
of
exercise
illegitimate
potentially
Underenforcement practices traced to such sources are thus particularly
suspect.
This raises a special point about the legal protection due to those who
themselves break the law-in our examples, prostitutes, undocumented
workers, or the young men who populate the illegal drug economy. Part of
the victimization of these groups flows from the hostility of law
enforcement officials, who may perceive these groups as threatening,
uncooperative, or at least undeserving.
The Supreme Court has made clear that as a constitutional matter, the
mere fact that a person has committed a crime does not relieve the state of
179. Id.
180. Cf Sara Sun Beale,. The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and

Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 747, 749 (2005) ("[T]he common
features of overcriminalization include[]: (1) excessive unchecked discretion in enforcement
authorities, (2) inevitable disparity among similarly situated persons, (3) potential for abuse
by enforcement authorities, (4) potential to undermine other significant values and evade
significant procedural protections, and (5) misdirection of scarce resources.").
181. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 76-77
(1980); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The
TorturedArgument ofInvidious Intent, 93 Yale L.J. 111 (1983).
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its obligations to that person under due process and equal protection
principles.1 82 But even more fundamentally, the choice to extend universal
legal protection to criminals and noncriminals alike is a species of
commitment to the rule of law. The neutrality and universality of the law is
weakened if a person's general entitlement to state protection against
violence and crime turns on their own good or bad behavior. Moreover, as
seen from the examples above, rolling legal protections back from those
who violate the law is part of a vicious cycle which exacerbates violence
and lawlessness within those underenforcement zones. The fact that
enforcement officials consciously discount the safety and security of those
who violate the law, while understandable as a matter of human nature, is
counterproductive as a legal policy.
Second,
even
absent
intentional
discrimination,
however,
underenforcement is problematic when it reinscribes and reinforces existing
group disadvantage. Underenforcement is at its most harmful when it
systematically fails in what Sklansky calls "the egalitarian project of
protecting all citizens from private violence."' 183 When underenforcement
affects socially vulnerable groups, fairness concerns are at their height. It
also becomes a strong form of inegalitarian redistribution as public
resources are channeled away from impoverished and politically weak
184
groups or communities.
Conversely, if an underenforcement practice is widely scattered, if the
practice does not affect a discernable group, or if the group affected by the
practice is politically powerful in its own right, then the practice is arguably
better left to the political and criminal process. 185 This is not because the
practice inflicts no harm, but rather because it embodies the recognition that
as long as police and prosecutors retain the authority to make choices, some
victimization and/or favoritism will inhere in the discretionary selection
process.
Third, underenforcement should also be scrutinized when it significantly
interferes with victims' ability to engage in basic functions such as the
maintenance of personal security, work, health, or economic advancement.
When this happens, criminal underenforcement becomes a strong form of
social welfare policy and deserves special attention. In under-policed urban
communities, for example, underenforcement prevents people from
182. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (describing prison officials'
duty to protect prisoners from rape and assault); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982).
183. Sklansky, supra note 11, at 1822.

184. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1394; Sklansky, supra note 84, at 98
("[P]olicing is among other things a form of redistribution.").
185. The recent spate of white-collar prosecutions have been interpreted by some as a
political backlash against the long-standing underenforcement of white-collar crimes. See
Pamela H. Bucy, "Carrots and Sticks ": Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 Buff. Crim. L.

Rev. 277 (2004) (documenting new criminal sanctions after the Enron corporate scandal);
Kurt Eichenwald & Alexei Barrionuevo, Tough Justicefor Executives in Enron Era, N.Y.

Times, May 27, 2006, at Al (describing differences between recent stepped-up enforcement
against white-collar offenders and previous enforcement practices).
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engaging in fundamental functions such as getting jobs, forming
institutional relations, and obtaining education. This stunts their ability to
participate fully in society. 186 Likewise, for undocumented workers,
underenforcement prevents them from engaging in basic social activities
such as joining unions and collective bargaining to which they are legally
entitled. These effects take underenforcement out of the narrow realm of
law enforcement policy and place it squarely within larger public concerns
about social capital and organization. Conversely, when underenforcement
risks marginal or non-fundamental benefits, the demands of law
enforcement discretion may outweigh the interests of those whose benefits
or activities are affected.
Fourth, because enforcement practices are central to maintaining the
legitimacy of law enforcement, underenforcement should trigger special
concern when it undermines civilians' ongoing relationships with law
enforcement officials, their adherence to law-abiding norms, or public
perceptions about the system's evenhandedness and legitimacy. As
discussed above, underenforcement can generate widespread distrust of law
enforcement, increase offending rates, and exacerbate crime. When
underenforcement undermines the effectiveness of law enforcement in these
ways, this effect should cast doubt on the underenforcement practice at
issue.
On the other hand, all underenforcement potentially leaves some victim
disillusioned with the state of the law. Underenforcement also takes place
routinely without affecting the overall viability or legitimacy of the criminal
system.187 If the normative effects of underenforcement are random--or do
not otherwise affect the general quality of lawfulness or police relations in
the community, group, or institution-then it may not justify tampering
with law enforcement choices. Indeed, policing is an infamously unpopular
job, and the ebb and flow of public opinion and community-police relations
are important indicators of the strength of laws themselves.
Public
dissatisfaction should thus not be treated as an easy basis for jettisoning
enforcement policies.
Finally, underenforcement should be rationalized and justified by
independent, countervailing values above and beyond the raw exercise of
political power. 188 The discussion above illustrates the sorts of positive
values that can be served by underenforcement and that can render
underenforcement an appropriate governmental response. The exception
for the exercise of political power is important because underenforcement
skews the ability of groups to exercise political power in the first instance.
Although, as noted above, normal political competition will often lead to
unequal distributions, when those distributions result in unjustified group

186. See supra Part I.A.
187. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8; Raymond, supra note 150.
188. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 32, at v (arguing that police should have to publicly

defend their underenforcement policies in open administrative processes).
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handicaps or pervasive disadvantages, the political process alone cannot
validate such results. The Machiavellian fact that inner-city residents
cannot wrest sufficient resources from state and local legislatures should
not itself form a normative justification for the underenforcement policies
resulting from that weakness.
However, law enforcement decisions
necessarily compete with other values and priorities, and independent
values such as free speech, privacy, or even efficacy may be powerful
reasons to tolerate some levels of underenforcement.
Obviously, each of the five factors suffers from problems with
measurement and subjectivity. Who is to say whether music copyright
holders are the sort of "group" entitled to special consideration, or whether
a particular policy fails to protect a life function that is "basic"? These are
subjects for debate, not scientific resolution. Indeed, the factors highlight
the perspectival nature of underenforcement in which the same law
enforcement practice can simultaneously oppress one constituency while
appearing judicious and appropriate to another. 189 Moreover, no one factor
should be seen as automatically invalidating an underenforcement policy.
Rather, taken together, the factors suggest ways of discussing the
differences between problematic underenforcement practices and routine,
perfectly appropriate allocations of police resources. In effect, these factors
embody the conclusion that when underenforcement makes vulnerable
groups or communities into lesser citizens, depriving them of fundamental
benefits of citizenship and social belonging without serious justifications, it
should no longer be committed to the unfettered discretion of individual
police and prosecutors, or the democratic free-for-all through which we
typically allocate such social resources.
III.

CONCEPTUALIZING UNDERENFORCEMENT

Although underenforcement is a well-known phenomenon, it tends to get
sidelined in debates over criminal doctrine and institutional structure. This
section presents three conceptualizations of underenforcement:
law
enforcement discretion, democratic responsiveness, and the constitutional
contours of the social safety net. These conceptualizations are an effort to
enrich the theoretical understanding of underenforcement and to elevate it
within extant debates over the effectiveness and legitimacy of the criminal
system. They also suggest how an enhanced appreciation for the hazards of
underenforcement puts new pressures on standard doctrinal treatments of
policing.

189. This dissonance is reflected, for example, in current debates over whether "zero
tolerance" quality-of-life policing is inappropriately heavy-handed towards the poor and
dispossessed, or whether it represents a newly respectful attitude toward low-income
communities. Compare Harcourt, supra note 15, with Meares & Kahan, supra note 35.
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A. Current UnderenforcementDoctrine
Jurisprudentially speaking, underenforcement is a non-issue. 190 Two
strands of jurisprudence render this so. First is the Supreme Court's highly
deferential treatment of enforcement decisions-to arrest or not to arrest, to
charge or not to charge-rendered by law enforcement officials. The
Supreme Court consistently treats underenforcement of the criminal law as
a necessary incident of law enforcement discretion, which in turn is
practically unreviewable. 19 1 Absent unconstitutional motivations, a single
1 92
instance of non-enforcement triggers no cognizable legal concerns.
Police may decline to arrest a person whom they have probable cause to
believe has committed a crime. Likewise, prosecutors routinely and
properly decide not to press charges that are legally supportable. Indeed,
we recognize that police and prosecutors cannot and should not pursue
every case they might, and the Supreme Court has made clear that
individual police3 failures to enforce laws and even direct court orders are
19
not actionable.
Even when nonenforcement decisions reach systemic proportions, law
enforcement decision makers are well shielded from judicial scrutiny. In
United States v. Armstrong, the Court declined to permit discovery
regarding racially suspect prosecutorial charging patterns based in large part
on the understanding that prosecutorial discretion is the "special province of
the Executive," entitled to a "presumption of regularity."' 94 This sort of
judicial cloaking of prosecutorial decisions tends to validate all under- and
overenforcement policies; it also ensures that the public will rarely be able
to obtain information about actual enforcement patterns. Even more
definitively, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 195 the Court declined to invalidate
190. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413,
1492 (1989) (noting that in general the Constitution imposes no obligation on the
government to provide services and therefore "random underenforcement is not
constitutionally objectionable"); see also Cheng, supra note 123, at 661 n.20 ("The Supreme
Court has never struck down a law for underenforcement .... ").
191. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ("[T]he decision whether
or not to prosecute . . . generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion." (citing
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978))); see also Inmates of Attica Corr.
Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that prosecutors' discretionary
decisions not to charge prison officials who killed inmates were unreviewable).
192. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (prosecutorial discretion "is subject to constitutional
constraints [such as] equal protection" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
193. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (finding no cause of
action against police who failed to enforce a domestic violence restraining order); see also
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (concluding that a mother lacked
standing to complain of the state's failure to prosecute a father for failure to pay child
support where the prosecution would result in prison term but not necessarily payment,
noting that "a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another").
194. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464; see also id. at 465 (holding that in order to obtain
discovery regarding prosecutorial choices suggesting race discrimination, petitioners must
already have credible evidence that similarly situated defendants were not prosecuted).
195. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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discretionary prosecutorial decisions that resulted in statistically significant
racial disparities in the treatment of capital defendants. The decision reads
like a treatise on discretion, in which the Court describes the near-sanctity
of law enforcement choice and the central role that discretionary decisions
196
by police, prosecutors, and juries play throughout the criminal system.
Armstrong and McCleskey have been widely interpreted to preclude
meaningful judicial review of the systemic impact of law enforcement
97
discretion. 1

This jurisprudential deference to discretion renders underenforcement
practices legally invisible, even when those enforcement practices are
facially suspect.
McCleskey, in particular, illustrates the Court's
recognition that things can go very wrong with enforcement practices
without triggering judicial responses. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit explained, courts will avoid intervening in prosecutorial
discretionary decisions even where "serious questions are raised as to the
protection of the civil rights and physical security of a definable class of
victims of crime and as to the fair administration of the criminal justice
system."1 98 Even the most problematic underenforcement practices are thus
rendered legally subsidiary to the system's larger commitment and
deference to broad law enforcement discretion.
The second strand of jurisprudence that shields criminal
underenforcement from review is the Court's long-standing commitment to
a "negative" theory of constitutional rights, under which the state is not
constitutionally obligated to provide for basic human needs, even when
such needs are themselves necessary to preserve life, liberty, or material
equality. 199 This general approach characterizes the Court's treatment of a
196. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296 ("[T]he policy considerations behind a prosecutor's
traditionally 'wide discretion' suggest the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend
their decisions to seek death penalties." (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607
(1985))); id. at 297 ("Implementation of the[] [criminal] laws necessarily requires
discretionary judgments. Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we
would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been
abused."); see also id. at 293 n.12 (noting that cases in which the Court has invalidated
government action based on statistical patterns of discrimination are "rare").
197. Richard H..McAdams has pointed out that information about similarly situated
individuals will rarely be available because non-charge and non-arrest decisions are rarely
documented, and there are few independent sources of data on crime commission that could
shed light on underenforcement rates. See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective
Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 605, 618-19
(1998); see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13 (1998) (documenting the pervasiveness of race in
prosecutorial decision making and the barriers to revealing it created by the Armstrong
standard).

198. Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973)
(refusing to direct prosecutors to investigate and prosecute cases involving prison guards
who murdered inmates and committed other civil rights violations).
199. Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process
Clause, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 982, 1010-11 (1996) (describing the "negative liberties" theory and
defending the Court's "failure-to-protect" jurisprudence as appropriately deferential to
political budget allocation decisions); see also David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46
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wide range of social services, from education to abortion. 20 0 Absent any
racial or other independently unconstitutional basis for the inequality, the
state's failure to provide services, or even failure to provide them in equal
measure, 2 0 1 rarely triggers constitutional concern.
In the criminal law context, this negative rights philosophy is embodied
in DeShaney v. Winebago County Department of Social Services, in which
the Court held that the state's failure to protect an individual from private
violence does not violate substantive due process. 20 2 As the Court stated,
[N]othing in the language
State to protect the life,
invasion by private actors.
to act, not as
State's power2 03
and security.

of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
liberty, and property of its citizens against
The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the
a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety

That holding has been widely interpreted as the final word on the question
of whether some level of minimally adequate policing might be
20 4
constitutionally required.
More recently, the Court extended its position in DeShaney, holding in
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales that even where a court orders police to
perform a protective function-in that case by issuing a domestic violence
protective order-and even where state law mandates police protection, this
does not give rise to a protected property interest as a matter of procedural
due process. 20 5 In denying Jessica Gonzales's claim that police failure to
enforce a restraining order violated her property interest, the Court
concluded broadly that "the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 .. . did not create a system by which police
departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better
20 6
policing might have prevented.
Together, DeShaney and Gonzales stand for the proposition that the
Constitution does not mandate police protection. Even court orders and
legislative enactments that call for police protection in specific instances
will not give rise to constitutionally protected interests. In effect, police
UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1280-87 (1999) (describing the traditional view of police protection as

an allocative and therefore essentially political decision against which due process claims are
unavailable).
200. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the state is not obligated to
fund abortion); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding no
fundamental right to education).
201. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 315-16 (concluding that the state is permitted to unequally

subsidize medically necessary abortion in relation to other medical options even when such
policies prevent indigent women from obtaining abortions).
202. DeShaney v. Winebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1999) (holding

that the state was not liable for failure to protect a child who was beaten to the point of brain
damage by his father even though the state department knew of and documented the danger
of abuse).
203. Id. at 195.
204. See Sklansky, supra note 199, at 1281 & nn. 620-24, 1282 & n.625.
205. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005).

206. Id.
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and prosecutors retain their discretion to underenforce the law and allocate
resources as they please even in the face of judicial and legislative mandates
to the contrary.
B. Discretion
Judicial commitment to law enforcement discretion lies at the heart of the
system's tolerance for underenforcement. A large literature is devoted to
criticizing the scope and effects of discretion. While this scholarship does
not zero-in on underenforcement per se-indeed it tends to focus on
selective
enforcement
and
overenforcement
rather
than
underenforcement 2 0 7-it provides a useful conceptual framework for the
phenomena discussed above. In particular, it offers two perspectives on the
problematic quality of discretionary underenforcement: first, as a lack of
regularity and accountability that threatens rule of law; and second, as a
socially harmful exercise of official power as embodied in actual law
enforcement practices.
1. Underenforcement as a Rule-of-Law Problem
Scholars have long pointed out that law enforcement discretion is so
broad, unregulated, and opaque that it weakens many precepts of rule of law
and democratic accountability. 20 8 Francis Allen identifies enforcement
discretion as a species of normlessness and lawlessness at the center of the
struggle to maintain a fair criminal system consistent with the rule of
law. 209 Stuntz describes the system of police and prosecutorial discretion as
"the antithesis of the rule of law" 2 10 and as "suffering from a kind of
lawlessness." 2 11 He points out that broad codes further exacerbate the
problem by overcriminalizing behavior and thus expanding law
enforcement choice.2 12 Erik Luna argues that discretionary enforcement

207. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 197 (describing racially selective enforcement); Luna,
supra note 37, at 557-58 (criticizing prosecutorial discretion for its tendency to overenforce
drug laws in minority communities); Stuntz, supra note 1 (criticizing tendency of law
enforcement discretion to focus on unpopular or politically convenient targets). But see
Richman & Stuntz, supra note 151, at 613 (arguing that the "extreme disjunction between
federal jurisdiction and federal resources has bred a norm of radical underenforcement").
208. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1521, 1566 (1981) (arguing that with respect to prosecutorial discretion generally, "[w]e

presently tolerate a degree of secrecy in one of our most crucial decisionmaking agencies
that is not only inconsistent with an open and decent system of justice, but that may not even
be efficient in avoiding the additional effort necessary to make the system accountable"); see
also id. at 1525 ("[P]rosecutors' virtually unlimited control over charging [i]s inconsistent
with a system of criminal procedure fair to defendants and to the public.").
209. See Francis A. Allen, The Habits of Legality: Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law
22-23 (1996).
210. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 578.
211. Id. at 597.
212. Id. at 550 (arguing that prosecutorial agency costs such as fixed salaries, professional

incentives, and convenience, coupled with unfettered discretion, generate a "tendency
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2 13
practices bereft of public rules tend to undermine the law's legitimacy.
Angela Davis describes prosecutorial discretion as a window through which
racial bias distorts the system. 214 The police's nearly unfettered ability to
as a structural invitation to
decide when to arrest has been pinpointed
2 15
racism, corruption, and inefficiency.
The specific pathologies of underenforcement are partially explicable in
terms of these broad criticisms of discretion. Pervasive underenforcement
can indicate that rules are not being predictably or regularly followed, that
law enforcement actors lack accountability, and that the rule of law is
wearing thin. It provides the authority and opportunity to single out groups
for neglect, reflecting racism, sexism, or other forms of official hostility. It
undermines crucial police habits such as following rules and acting
evenhandedly. In this sense, underenforcement is a familiar figure lurking
within the discretion debate.
Indeed, underenforcement can be understood as a concrete erosion of
some classic rule-of-law principles. The "rule of law" is, of course, not
reducible to one definition or set of requirements, 2 16 but the concept
typically contains some demand that the law be universal and consistent and
that those applying the law be bound by the universality and consistency
demands. 2 17 Two leading descriptions of "rule of law" illustrate the central
role of consistent enforcement. According to Richard Fallon,
First, the Rule of Law should protect against anarchy and the Hobbesian
war of all against all. Second, the Rule of Law should allow people to
plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that they can know in
advance the legal consequences of various actions. Third, the Rule of
Law should2 18guarantee against at least some types of official
arbitrariness.

Margaret Radin identifies three different conceptions of rule of law. The
"instrumental" version, drawn from Lon Fuller's work, includes a
requirement of "congruence," which means that "explicitly promulgated
toward underenforcement" which legislatures compensate for by broadening criminal
codes); see also Luna, supra note 1.
213. Luna, supra note 37, at 523 ("[T]he gap between the penal code and its
administration tends to undermine the legitimacy of legal commands."); see also Erik Luna,
Transparent Policing, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1107 (2000) (arguing that opaque, discretionary
policing undermines democratic values).
214. See Davis, supra note 197.
215. See, e.g., Cole, No Equal Justice, supra note 4; David A. Harris, The Stories, the
Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 275-88
(1999); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 342-62

(1998); see also Skolnick, supra note 18, at 88-89 (describing how police discretion in
relation to race varies according to context).
216. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse,

97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1997) (describing various versions of the rule-of-law ideal and
noting that the ideal is "what some philosophers have called an 'essentially contestable
concept"').
217. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering The Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 781 (1989).
218. Fallon, supra note 216, at 7-8.
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rules must correspond with the rules inferable from patterns of enforcement
by functionaries." 2 19 The "substantive conception," drawn from the work
of John Rawls, includes the idea that rule of law is necessary "to control
Leviathan [because] 'the dangers to liberty are less where the law is
impartially and regularly administered in accordance with the principle of
legality."' 220
Radin proposes an additional conception, based on a
Wittgensteinian "social practice conception of rules," in which rules emerge
not from formal edifices but shared practices, or "agreement in responsive
action." 22 1 Under this social practice conception of rules, a rule is public
and provides notice "whenever strong social agreement exists in
practice." 222 In other words, the existence of consistent, shared social
practices determines whether official action can be considered public,
universal, and nonarbitrary, or whether individuals are in fact subject to the
"rule of men" and not the rule of law.
Even at this level of generality, systemic underenforcement of the sort
223
described above is in obvious tension with these rule-of-law principles.
Rule of law requires that enforcement practices make real the law's
promises of universality, publicity, and predictability. They should also
maintain the security of social interactions to "protect[] against anarchy" 224
and permit the possibility of personal liberty. These values, however, are
precisely the ones eroded by underenforcement.
Pervasive
underenforcement is a form of "official arbitrariness" that perpetuates the
"Hobbesian war of all against all," preventing people from knowing in
advance the "legal consequences of various actions. '22 5 It undermines the
"congruence" of promulgated rules with official action; and it weakens
shared social practices and agreement about what the rules actually are. If,
as so many scholars fear, discretion inherently threatens rule of law,
systemic underenforcement is one of the ways that threat becomes real.
2. Underenforcement as a Social Practice Problem
Even as underenforcement's inconsistencies render it formally
problematic, its concrete operation and harms are still not fully captured by
general complaints about discretion's lawlessness. Noting the formal
lawlessness of discretion, or the fact that a particular code provision has not
been enforced, does not necessarily tell us who or what has been harmed.
More generally, it does not reveal at what point underenforcement morphs

219. Radin, supra note 217, at 784-85.
220. Id. at 789 (quoting J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 241 (1971)).
221. Id. at 798.
222. Id. at 815.
223. Both Fallon's and Radin's work reflect a preoccupation with judicial, rather than
executive, discretion in the maintenance of rule of law. See id.at 790-91, 796; Fallon, supra
note 216, at 24-36.
224. Fallon, supra note 216, at 7-8.
225. Id.
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from the perfectly legitimate, individual law enforcement choice not to
investigate, arrest, or prosecute, into something problematic.
As Radin puts it, "In order to find out what rules exist... we must 'look
and see' what the practice is." 226 In order to understand the nature of
discretion we need a further layer of description of the actual social
practices that constitute underenforcement. A glimpse of those practices is
offered above. Problematic underenforcement practices have symptoms:
official hostility towards victims, increased group disadvantage, impaired
life functions, weakened community-law enforcement relations, and the
lack of countervailing justifications. 22 7 These are the poisonous fruits, so to
speak, of underenforcement. When enforcement patterns reflect these
symptoms, it is a sign that law enforcement discretion is being exercised in
problematic ways. Conversely, when underenforcement practices do not
manifest these symptoms, it suggests that discretionary exercises of power
228
are well tailored to individual and community needs.
Treating discretion as a set of legally significant social practices builds
on foundations laid by pragmatist, critical race, feminist, social norm, and
other scholarships that insist on locating the "law" in actual legal
practices. 229 In Radin's words, "[M]aking rules and applying rules cannot
be radically separate activities ....
Every time we apply a rule we also
make it."'230 These scholarships share the insight that social (here
enforcement) practices are not secondary effects of, but rather are integral
to, the law, giving it social and normative meaning without which it could
not function.
Such pragmatic approaches run counter to formalist
tendencies within criminal law that treat the "law" and its enforcement as
two distinct, hermetically sealed bodies of concern. 23 1 Indeed, the focus on
enforcement generally, and underenforcement in particular, reflects an
implicit assertion that the "criminal law" cannot be understood or evaluated

226. Radin, supra note 217, at 808.
227. See supra Part II.C.
228. See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 150 (discussing the primarily normative impact of
underenforcement of petty offenses that the public does not believe should be fully

enforced).
229. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law of Tort, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 957, 1008 (1989) ("[I]n everyday life we...
experience privacy ... as an inherently normative set of social practices that constitute a way

of life, our way of life."); see, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social
Science Perspective 1-2 (1975) ("Almost everyone concedes that law is to some degree a
social product; and that law on the books and law in action are not invariably the same.");
Radin, supra note 217, at 807; see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race
Theory and PoliticalLawyering Practicein Post-CivilRights America, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 821
(1997).
230. Radin, supra note 217, at 807.
231. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Reforming American Penal Law, 90 J. Crim. L. &

Criminology 49, 50 (1999). Stuntz has long made the point that criminal law is not merely a
set of formal rules but rather is a set of institutional relationships by which power and
accountability are distributed. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 528; see also id. at 508 & n.4

(bemoaning the lack of scholarly attention to enforcement).
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apart from the official practices through which the meaning of formal
232
criminal rules are realized.
To conceptualize underenforcement as a set of social practices is, in some
sense, merely a way of voicing that general antiformalist position. But even
more than other aspects of the criminal law, underenforcement demands
this approach because enforcement discretion is peculiarly devoid of formal
rules. 233 It embodies the turn toward "law-in-action" precisely because the
234
substantive criminal law does not contain its own rules of application.
The absence of enforcement, in turn, makes room for the expression of
powerful nonlegal forces such as economic and political hegemony, bias,
and violence. Underenforcement is marked, moreover, by extreme judicial
deference to whatever practices in which law enforcement actors happen to
engage. The specific nature of these practices determines the true meaning
and character of enforcement and thus the quality of justice that the system
actually delivers. It is these practices, therefore, and the extent to which
they permit lawlessness and inequality, that fully reveal underenforcement's
proper place in the debate over the legitimacy of law enforcement
discretion.
C. DemocraticPolicing
Francis Allen wrote that the problem of discretionary enforcement
reflects an ongoing compromise between rule-of-law precepts and the
realities of democratic pluralism, as "the habits of legality struggle against
the social and political fragmentation of a pluralistic society. '235
Underenforcement is paradigmatic of this struggle: It is a concrete example
of how abstract lawfulness-full and equal enforcement of the law-gives
232. A more thorough exploration of the nature of the "law" is beyond this piece. The
antiformalist position captures some piece of this insistence on locating law in practice. See
Christopher Kutz, Pragmatism Regained, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1639, 1652-54 (2002) (book
review) (sketching the positions of key pragmatic legal philosophers and their positions on
the role of morality and social facts in defining authoritative "law").
233. See, e.g., Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local
Settings: Agency Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate

Crime, 39 Law & Soc'y Rev. 893 (2005) (documenting how variations in local meanings of
hate crime in California stem in part from law enforcement discretion and divergent
practices).
234. Markus Dubber, for example, has called for a practical focus in understanding the
meaning of substantive law, arguing that "artificial distinctions" between criminal rules and
their applications threaten to render criminal scholarship irrelevant. Dubber, supra note 23 1,
at 50. He argues for "the transformation of penal law scholarship into a praxis oriented, and
in this sense positivistic, discipline," with a focus on the codified nature of criminal law and
its applications. Id. at 58 ("The new discipline of penal law begins and ends with praxis.");
see also id. at 59 ("The analysis of the rules of penal law must take into consideration their
application. Still, that consideration should not come at the expense of considering the rule
itself."). Enforcement discretion creates an even stronger demand for such a shift because it
is characterized precisely by the lack of codified or formal rules.
235. Allen, supra note 209, at 95; see also Dubber, supra note 22, at xv (asking whether
"the power to police, and the criminal law with it, can survive in a modern democratic
state").
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way to pluralistic pressures, resulting in the uneven distribution of law
enforcement resources. In particular, when underenforcement rests on
official indifference to the needs and suffering of disadvantaged groups, it
reflects a breakdown in the state's responsiveness to its most vulnerable
constituents, one of pluralism's infamous dangers.
When this
responsiveness failure leads in turn to the inegalitarian distribution of one of
society's most valuable resources-the protection of the law itself-this is a
harm of significant democratic proportions. It is all the more notable for
the fact that judicial doctrines of discretion dismiss nonenforcement as a
236
cognizable harm.
There is renewed scholarly interest in the democratic character of
policing. 23 7 To survey the many contributions would require a separate
article, but a few examples highlight the democratic dimensions of
underenforcement.
Although Sklansky does not dissect underenforcement practices per se,
he argues broadly for a democratic theory of policing based on concerns
about responsiveness and redistribution. Taking the "perspective from
which democracy is . . . about opposition to entrenched patterns of
unjustified inequality," Sklansky maintains that policing is a central
democratic function because police "are both a uniquely powerful weapon
against private systems of domination and a uniquely frightening tool of
official domination. ' 238 Democratized policing should "give[] voice to
disempowered groups and marginalized perspectives [rather than] simply
grant[ing] another avenue of access to people and viewpoints already well
' 239
served by the political process.
This approach clarifies why underenforcement is not merely an
inefficiency but a potential blot on the legitimacy of the criminal system: It
represents the state's failure to make good on its democratic obligation to
protect against the private domination of physical and economic
victimization, itself a classic justification for the existence of the coercive
powers of the state in the first instance. 240 Sklansky's formulation also
nicely reframes the salience of the under- and overenforcement phenomena:
Together, they represent a sort of ultimate failure in which police
236. See supra Part II.A.
237. Both these terms "democratic" and "policing" are contested and used differently by
scholars. Compare Dubber, supra note 22, at xi (describing the power to police generally as
the innate authority of the government to regulate the public welfare), with Meares & Kahan,
supra note 35 (referring to policing more narrowly as the criminal law enforcement function
carried out by police officers).
238. Sklansky, supra note 11, at 1808.
239. Id. at 1812. Sklansky also describes how those who cannot afford private police
protection may suffer from underenforcement. Id. at 1820.
240. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Connon-wealth
Ecclesiasticall and Civill 124 (Barnes & Noble Books 2004) (1651) ("The final cause, end,
or design of men, who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others, in the introduction of
that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the
foresights of their own preservation ... ; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that
miserable condition of war ....
).
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simultaneously fail to protect victims against "private systems of
domination" even as they overreach with their "tool[s] of official
domination." 24 1 Sklansky's cure for both is making law enforcement
actors-from police to prosecutors to lawmakers and judges-more
responsive to the multiple and sometimes competing demands of those who
populate policed communities.
As Sklansky points out, treating enforcement as a problem of democratic
responsiveness resonates with some of the central insights of community
policing. Although "community policing" has become a catchall descriptor
for myriad police practices, it is generally characterized by its attention to
relationships between police and community and by an appreciation of the
value of police responsiveness. 24 2 With its emphasis on foot patrols, officer
training, and individual relationships rather than command-and-control
tactics, it recognizes that law enforcement presence can be positive or
negative depending on how authority is wielded. Part of the appeal of
community policing is that its effectiveness is not measured solely in terms
of its impact on crime statistics, but by improvements in the democratic
responsiveness of the state, embodied in its agents, the police. In these
senses, community policing is inherently sympathetic to treating the
problem of underenforcement as a lack of democratic responsiveness.
On the other hand, as Sklansky also argues, "community policing" is not
a talismanic solution. Demanding increased police responsiveness does not
answer the question, To whom in the "community" should law enforcement
be responsive? Critics of "community policing" charge that it elides or
even replicates inequalities by assuming that communities are homogenous
or that there even is such a thing as the "community" which can
legitimately authorize the police to infringe the liberties of (some of) its
residents. 243 This elision is of particular concern in the underenforcement
context.
Insofar as the groups who tend to suffer most from
underenforcement victimization are also the ones that may lack a voice in
their own community and institutions-the poor, people of color,
prostitutes, or illegal immigrants-community policing merely postpones
244
the question of true egalitarian responsiveness to another day.
Meares and Kahan also call for more democratic forms of policing, by
which they mean policing that is more responsive to certain sorts of
community demands. In particular, they call for broader policing authority
such as curfews, anti-gang ordinances, and expanded search powers when
241. Sklansky, supra note 11, at 1808.
242. See Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in
American Neighborhoods 92 (1990) ("Community Policing requires that police be

responsive to citizen demands when they decide what local problems are, and set their
priorities.").
243. E.g., Harcourt, supra note 15; Robert Weisberg, RestorativeJustice and the Danger
of "Community, " 2003 Utah L. Rev. 343.
244. See supra notes 233-41 and accompanying text (pointing out that whether a
particular underenforcement practice is beneficial or harmful depends on which community
constituency is being analyzed).
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the community being policed demands them. 24 5 Their controversial
assertion that inner-city residents should be permitted to retract
constitutional constraints on police in pursuit of safer neighborhoods is
centrally an argument about the role of participatory democracy in
establishing the parameters of the police state. Specifically, they argue that
some constitutional constraints on police efficacy have a
disempowering effect on inner-city communities. Criminologists have
long recognized that inner-city crime both creates and is sustained by
atomization and distrust, which in turn make it harder for individuals to
engage in the cooperative self-policing characteristic of crime-free
communities. A healthy democratic political life can help repair these
conditions. That is precisely what residents of the inner city enjoy when
they are free to adopt or approve
building searches, gang-loitering
246
ordinances, curfews, and the like.
Criticisms of the Meares and Kahan proposals, in turn, revolve mainly
around assertions that they have gotten their democratic theory wrong. Joel
Handler and Carol Steiker dispute the underlying assertion that African
Americans have become sufficiently politically empowered to warrant
tinkering with constitutional protections. 247 Steiker further argues that an
important part of our democratic tradition includes inalienable
constitutional protections against police overreaching that are not subject to
political negotiation. 248 Others scholars agree, however, that the drive for a
better "organizational
framework for dialogue and decision-making 249 and
"more democracy" 2 50 is the right approach, even as they dispute Meares
25 1
and Kahan's conclusions about the process.
These debates share the intuition that police responsiveness is a central
feature of democratic policing and therefore of the legitimacy of the state
itself. To whom the police should respond, and what the police should do
in response, remain hotly contested. Nevertheless, the notion that police
should react directly to individual and community needs is increasingly
accepted. Such theories suggest that underenforcement is problematic

245. See generally Meares & Kahan, supra note 15; see also Meares & Kahan, supra note

35, at 5, 16-17.
246. Meares & Kahan, supra note 35, at 21.
247. Joel F. Handler, It's Not So Simple, in Urgent Times: Policing and Rights in Inner-

City Communities, supra note 35, at 45, 47 (calling Meares and Kahan's faith in AfricanAmerican political power "truly amazing" and "naive"); Bernard Harcourt, Matrioshka

Dolls, in Urgent Times: Policing and Rights in Inner-City Communities, supra note 35, at
81, 82-84 (criticizing Meares and Kahan's "political-process theory" for failing to define
adequately the "African American community" or its interests); Carol S. Steiker, More
Wrong Than Rights, in Urgent Times: Policing and Rights in Inner-City Communities,
supra note 35, at 49, 52-53 (calling this "rosy picture... utterly implausible").
248. Steiker, supra note 247, at 55-56.
249. Wesley Skogan, Everybody's Business, in Urgent Times: Policing and Rights in
Inner-City Communities, supra note 35, at 58, 60.
250. Harcourt, supra note 247, at 85-86.
251. See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 2 ("Politically accountable policing is key to preserving
democracy.").
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precisely because it is the ultimate form of official non-responsiveness.
Underenforcement is what happens when the police simply do not show up.
It thus represents the failure of a core function of law enforcementnamely, its responsibility not merely to enforce the laws as written, but to
do so in a way that validates the democratic vitality of those laws in
practice.
Treating the underenforcement problem as one of "democratic
responsiveness" is also useful in thinking about solutions to crime,
particularly when it comes to policing the disenfranchised. It shifts our
focus away from crime-like problems (low arrest and prosecutions rates,
high victimization rates) towards democratic-type problems (unequal
resource distributions, officials' unresponsiveness and unaccountability).
Possible solutions to the former (more police, greater governmental power,
more punishments) are not necessarily the sorts of solutions that address the
latter.
Increasingly punitive sanctions, the reduction of individual
protections against governmental overreaching, and heightened crackdowns
(for example on prostitutes or illegal immigration) will tend to increase the
victimization of those same groups and thus do not address the democratic
deficit. Indeed, as seen from the examples above, they may well make it
worse.
Rather, democratic ills demand democratic cures such as accountability,
transparency, and resource redistribution. To return to the three core
examples above, in the urban enforcement context this might mean better
staffed and trained urban police departments that would permit fuller
responses to citizen complaints; 252 police officers and departments
sensitized to the needs of vulnerable constituents; fully funded public
defender offices; institutional transparency mechanisms; 2 53 and alternative
sanctions. 254 Such measures are designed not simply to "fight crime" but to
extend meaningful and dignified protection and service to the underserved.
For prostitutes, this would mean improved police response to rape and
assault crimes, as well as the provision of health and education services that
would permit prostitutes to take advantage of the institutional protections
that are theoretically already available to them. 255 For undocumented
workers, the enforcement of existing wage and workplace safety laws
would mitigate the illegal working conditions that effectively "punish" such
workers for their immigration violations. In general, the democraticresponsiveness focus suggests that law enforcement should be treated as a
252. See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 51-54 (arguing that federal and state governments
should have greater control over both funding and regulation of local policing in order to
make policing more politically responsive).
253. See generally Sklansky, supra note 11 (advocating for increased transparency, police
training, and police-resident communications); see also Luna, supra note 37 (making similar
arguments).
254. See Brown, supra note 8, at 1345 (arguing that "street crime enforcement could take
strides toward preventive, compliance-oriented, less punitive, regulatory strategies that we

have devised for white-collar wrongdoing").
255. See supra Part I.B.
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mechanism by which disadvantaged groups are integrated into the lawabiding community, not exiled from it.
D. Equal and Adequate Policing?
An alternative way of appreciating underenforcement is by putting
pressure on the Supreme Court's commitment to a negative rights
jurisprudence in the area of police protection. The DeShaney and Gonzales
cases treat law enforcement as a public service like trash collection, health
care, or housing, 256 subject to the more general proposition that the state is
not obligated to provide such services in the first place, and therefore the
failure to provide is not' a constitutional harm.
Underlying this
characterization is an implicit rejection of any special, democracymaintaining quality of policing, or the idea that policing could be a unique
state obligation to which citizens might have a right above and beyond their
entitlement to conventional government benefits. While this conclusion is
deeply entwined with the Court's general commitment to law enforcement
discretion, 2 57 it provides additional, independent grounds for judicial
-deference to that discretion by its narrow and materialistic characterization
of the benefit under consideration.
The richer, democratically laden understanding of underenforcement
offered here poses a potential challenge to this narrow conceptualization of
policing. Community-policing advocates focus on responsiveness because
responsive policing is a measure of the appropriately respectful and
accountable posture of the state vis-A-vis its constituents. 2 58 The state's
failure to provide such policing indicates not merely distributive inequality
but political failure. Trash collection, health care, and housing are therefore
not the best models because under current doctrine they represent the failure
2 59
to provide services which are not essential to a functioning democracy.

256. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
257. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803 (2005) ("[A]

benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their
discretion." (citing Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989))); see also
id. at 2806 (stating that "seemingly mandatory legislative commands" should be interpreted
against the backdrop of "[t]he deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion"); see also
id. ("It is... simply 'common sense that all police officers must use some discretion in
deciding when and where to enforce city ordinances."' (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41, 62 (1999))).
258. See Part IV.B. It is in this sense that Stuntz argues for "accountable policing," police
that answer to constituents and not merely to fluctuations in crime statistics. Stuntz, supra
note 10, at 2.
259. I do not mean to discount arguments that housing and other basic material needs
should be constitutionally mandated, only to note that under current doctrine they are not.
See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword-On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969) (arguing that poverty
and material deprivation prevent the poor from participating in the democratic process);
Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality,Race, and Property,46 St. Louis U.

L.J. 665 (2002) (describing home-ownership as a fundamental source of American wealth
and how it has been historically withheld from African Americans).
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A better model might be education. In 1973, the Supreme Court decided
that education is not a "fundamental right" and that therefore the state's
failure to provide education in an equitable or adequate way violated no
constitutional mandate. 2 60 This decision triggered loud dissents, one of
which involved the argument that education is not like trash collection or
other municipal services but rather is "inextricably linked to the right to
rights
of free speech and
participate in the electoral process and to the 26
1
association guaranteed by the First Amendment.
While the Court never reversed its holding in Rodriguez, it subsequently
recognized the special social and democratic functions of education, thereby
distinguishing it from other social welfare services. In Plyler v. Doe,26 2 the
Court held that the state could not totally deprive the children of
undocumented aliens of public education, based in part on the Court's view
of the special role that education plays in participatory citizenship. As the
Court stated,
[While] [p]ublic education is not a right granted individuals by the
Constitution[,] ... neither is it merely some governmental benefit

indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation ....We
have recognized the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the
preservation of a democratic system of government .... [S]ome degree

of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom
and independence.... In sum, education has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society....

The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, economic,
intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the
obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to
reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic
education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause....

By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability
to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any
realistic possibility that they
will contribute in even the smallest way to
the progress of our Nation. 2 63
Structurally, the dual commands of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, as well as the language of most state constitutions, have shaped the
education debate into a dual inquiry of adequacy and equality. The former

260.
261.
262.
263.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 28 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 202, 221-23 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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represents a due process or minimal entitlements type of challenge: Has the
state provided an adequate minimum threshold of education? The second is
a comparative inquiry reflecting equality demands: Has the264
state provided
equal access to education as between jurisdictions or groups?
The education framework is suggestive in the policing context. After
DeShaney, some scholars argued that, like education, certain forms of
public protection might constitute special entitlements of the democracypreserving sort. 26 5 Moreover, the policing question naturally lends itself to
the dual adequacy-equality inquiry: whether the state has provided
sufficient enforcement protection to ensure minimal levels of citizenship,
and whether the disparities between policing resources give rise to
impermissible inequalities.
For example, as noted above, policing is the material distribution of the
rule of law. 266 Like education, policing has a "fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society" 2 67 because it provides the
"protect[ion] against anarchy and the Hobbesian war of all against all" 26 8
that is an essential role of the state.
Underenforcement is the
maldistribution of this fundamental good: It means that rules are not
uniformly or predictably enforced, and individuals may not be on notice
about when their conduct will be tolerated or punished by the state. As a
matter of the integrity of the criminal system and its commitment to rule of
law, therefore, some level of policing could be required in order to
guarantee that the law is meaningful in all four comers of the system. In
this sense, law enforcement is not only a material resource but an enabling
condition. In the same way that education enables citizenship, or the right
to counsel enables the exercise of all other procedural rights, 269 law
enforcement enables the exercise of the substantive law.
The theories of democratic policing discussed above also suggest that,
like education, policing has participatory and citizenship implications.
264. See Alexandra Natapoff, Commentary, 1993: The Year of Living Dangerously:
State Courts Expand The Right to Education, 92 Educ. L. Rep. 755 (1994). The debate over
the citizenship-enabling aspects of education has been muted on a federal level by the
existence of state constitutional provisions. Since every state constitution provides in some
form for a public education system, many of them mandating "equal" or "adequate"
education, the right-to-education debate has turned to these guarantees. See id
265. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 Const. Comment. 403
(1993) (arguing that DeShaney's subordination to his father triggered the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition against private slavery and, more generally, that the Amendment
might require state action in response to other forms of private violence and subordination);
Steven J. Heyman, The FirstDuty of Government: Protection,Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 Duke L.J. 507 (1991) (arguing that the framers originally intended a
constitutional right to protection). But see Armacost, supra note 199 (defending DeShaney
against these alternative theories).
266. See supra Part II.B. 1.
267. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
268. Fallon, supra note 216, at 7-9 (defining essential elements of rule of law).
269. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) ("The Sixth Amendment stands as
a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not
'still be done."' (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938))).
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Insofar as policing represents the state's respectful and responsive
engagement with its citizens, the state's failure to engage through
underenforcement is a nonmaterial, democratic harm-"a failure of political
accountability. '2 70 Under this analysis, some level of underenforcement
may be constitutionally suspect because it indicates that victims have been
excluded from participation in, and the benefits of, the democratic
27 1
system.
This argument holds strongest for the socially vulnerable and politically
disempowered. These groups are the least able to obtain adequate or equal
enforcement through the political system. In addition, the lack of
enforcement actually exacerbates their social disadvantage, creating the
vicious cycles described above. 272 Such constituents should have strong
claims to an extra-political check on the level of protection they receive,
precisely because the political system is likely to fail them in selfreinforcing ways.
These kinds of arguments illustrate how underenforcement intersects
with bedrock issues of minimal citizenship and equality. As a result, they
also reveal the narrowness of current underenforcement doctrine. In its
single-minded focus on discretion, the doctrine lacks the capacity to
appreciate the deeper democratic ramifications of systemic nonenforcement.
These expanded conceptualizations suggest that new doctrinal tools are
needed to evaluate enforcement decision making; like education, it is too
central to the state's overall function to be delegated wholly to the
unfettered discretion of law enforcement officials.
IV.

RETHINKING UNDERENFORCEMENT

A. Subordination and the City: Simultaneous Over- and
Underenforcement
Urban law enforcement is infamous for its overenforcement practices:
racial profiling, disproportionate drug arrests in inner cities, and police
disrespect and brutality-not to mention the harsh punishments that result
from such intense police attention. 273 These forms of overenforcement
have become increasingly recognized as a socially destructive, racially
charged, and counterproductive force in poor, high-crime communities.
270. Stuntz, supra note 10, at 13.
271. Insofar as it represents a general challenge to the constitutional non-protection of the

poor, this argument is neither new nor specific to policing. See Kenneth L. Karst, The
Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword-Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1977); Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and
ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1277 (1993) (arguing that poverty impedes the poor

from participating in the democratic process); Michelman, supra note 259, at 38-39.
272. Stuntz, supra note 10, at 14 ("[T]he failure [to address underenforcement] is more
serious than most of the legal issues scholars debate, partly because underpolicing makes all
other regulatory problems worse.").
273. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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In these very same communities, underenforcement produces a
complementary dynamic. The failure to enforce exposes residents to crime
and insecurity, while reinforcing the idea that they have been abandoned by
the state. As numerous black men are imprisoned for long periods of time
for nonviolent, economically motivated drug crimes, others criminals who
steal, assault, and even kill remain free. 274

Even as female-headed

households struggle economically for lack of partners, they must contend
with high crime rates and personal victimization tolerated by the very same
law enforcement system that locks up their husbands, brothers, and sons.
Indeed, over- and underenforcement can converge in the very same
person. A young black male who illegally carries a weapon because he
fears for his life is a victim of underenforcement; he believes, often
accurately, that the police will not protect him. When he is arrested on a
pretext

275

and given a longer sentence than his similarly situated white

counterpart, 276 he is also a victim of overenforcement. 2 77 The confluence
of over- and underenforcement in the same individual and community is
thus particularly destructive. It combines the harshest of punishments with
visible inaction, appearing at once unfair and ineffective.
Simultaneous over- and underenforcement also creates a gap between
police and community that undermines the police function. It deters
citizens from turning to the police, both because they fear the police will
mistreat them and because they lack faith that the police will protect them
from crime. This, in turn, makes law enforcement efforts to work with
residents appear futile; police often complain that they cannot solve cases
because residents do not cooperate with them. 278 As a result, police and
policy makers shift blame for crime back on to the community and its
lawbreakers. In effect, the gap validates police inaction and nonattention to
community needs. In a vicious cycle, underenforcement makes those
communities seem more "high-crime" and intractable which, in turn,
justifies even more punitive overenforcement. Sociologist Eric Monkkonen
labels this ragged urban justice system "a failure of the state," comparable
to state failures in developing nations. 279
In such communities, over- and underenforcement are not mutually
exclusive alternatives. Rather, they are dual symptoms of the breakdown in
relations between law enforcement and the community. They arise from the
274. See

Sentencing

Project,

Facts

About

Prisons

and

Prisoners,

http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1035.pdf (reporting that seventy-six percent of state
prisoners were incarcerated in 2002 for nonviolent offenses).
275. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 215, at 275-88.
276. Kennedy Commission Report, supra note 14, at 48-63 (documenting racial
disparities in sentencing).
277. See, e.g., Hagan & Peterson, supra note 29, at 23 ("For many ghetto youth...
[s]ometimes victimization can lead to offending. Some crime in minority neighborhoods
may be a product of retaliation, a form of what one researcher calls 'self-help."' (internal
citation omitted)).
278. See Stoutland, supra note 28; Leovy & Smith, supra note 24.
279. Leovy & Smith, supra note 24 (quoting Eric Monkkonen).
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same kinds of sources: official non-responsiveness, hostility towards
victims, and disrespect for individual dignity and rights. They also have
similar effects: group victimization, normative decay, increased violence,
and social distrust. In the end, they are both ways that the state abandons its
caretaking responsibilities, the one by over-punishing, the other by underprotecting.
In the urban policing context, underestimating the complexity of
underenforcement creates problems of its own. When treated quantitatively
as "too little policing," underenforcement is transformed from a resource
problem into a tragedy, because the putative cure, "more policing," is seen
as an invitation to the harms associated with overenforcement.2 80 Urban
law enforcement thus becomes a "no-win" situation: Urban residents must
give up the benefits of weak policing-personal privacy, civil liberties, and
protection against police overreaching-in exchange for greater police
This increased
protection against criminals and private violence. 28 1
policing, however, is associated with racial profiling, police disrespect, and
harsh punishments. 282 In other words, they must trade underenforcement
for overenforcement.
But, as this Article has tried to show, underenforcement is not merely
quantitative-a lack of police. Rather, it reflects qualitative, dynamic flaws
in the ways police exercise discretion, in relationships between police and
residents, and the political system's overall responsiveness to the policed.
After all, some communities manage to have quite satisfactory relationships
with their police forces. As Sklansky points out, wealthy employers of
private police are increasingly able to buy responsive "proactive" policing,
even as inner-city residents
are being left with less responsive, less effective
"reactive" policing. 283
The differences between good and bad
underenforcement turn on the intentions, relationships, and consequences of
police practices, characteristics that may be shared by overenforcement
practices as well.
Indeed, addressing underenforcement may even solve some kinds of
overenforcement problems. The solution to underenforcement will often
not be "more policing" or more arrests, but more or different policing of the
kind that remedies the specific harms of underenforcement such as official
hostility, group disadvantage, and the decay of police-civilian relations.
Remedies for these sorts of problems demand increased police
responsiveness and democratic sensitivity to all the stakeholders in the
policing process. These are the sorts of remedies that could potentially
address overenforcement concerns as well.
280. Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct "Outside the
Legitimate Investigative Sphere," 94 Cal. L. Rev. 617, 618 (2006) (describing tension

between the dual harms of crime and policing in urban communities as a "profound
paradox").
281. See, e.g., Meares & Kahan, supra note 35, at 14-15.
282. See Steiker, supra note 247, at 47.
283. Sklansky, supranote 11, at 1820.
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B. Underenforcementas an Expression of State Power
Underenforcement practices reveal the deep contours of state power.
Although the exercise of that power takes the form of inaction, the
"inaction" is fundamental to the state function because it consists of the
systematic failure to apply the rules. Or, as Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule have argued, "[w]here government is concerned, failures of
protection, through refusals to punish and deter private misconduct, cannot
'2 84
be justified by pointing to the distinction between acts and omissions.
Underenforcement thus reflects the state's abdication: its failure to address
social harm, to attend to the consequences of lawbreaking, and generally to
care for its constituents. Far from neutral, underenforcement is a powerful
way that the state weighs in on many distributive and democratic issues. It
also illustrates society's background assumptions about who matters and
who is entitled to public support. Predictably, underenforcement "zones"
rise up around groups and issues to which the state is generally inattentive,
285
namely, the dispossessed, the unpopular, and the politically silent.
Underenforcement practices thus reveal the gap between what the state
promises under the law and how it actually allocates scarce resources and
political legitimacy under the pressures of democratic pluralism. 286 In that
gap, underenforcement leaves room for the rawest jockeying among
political interest groups, power imbalances, and social hierarchies, for race
and sex discrimination, violence,' and all the other Hobbesian phenomena
that the Rule of Law is designed to mitigate.
The inattentiveness surrounding underenforcement contrasts strongly
with the Byzantine attention to detail that characterizes full-enforcement
zones.
The American legal system is infamous for its legalistic,
overdetermined regulatory system and the pervasiveness with which this
system creeps into the interstices of everyday life. 28 7 But such attentiveness
characterizes those areas to which the state apparatus is truly committed.
Underenforcement zones represent precisely those areas of the social fabric
to which state law enforcement actors are indifferent or even hostile. Urban
residents, prostitutes and their customers, and undocumented workers
represent many millions of people for whom underenforcement-the lack
of official protection and attention-is a daily reality and for whom the law
is an absentee landlord. This fact about the American legal system sits in
constant tension with the system's infamous thoroughness and harshness,

284. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 707; see also Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing as tenuous the

distinction between "action" and "inaction").
285. See Rodney Stark, Deviant Places: A Theory of the Ecology of Crime, 25
Criminology 893, 902 (1987) (asserting that "[s]tigmatized neighborhoods will suffer from

more lenient law enforcement").
286. See generally Allen, supra note 209.
287. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1348 (2002)
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particularly in communities
that suffer simultaneously from the worst
2 88
aspects of both.
To appreciate the significance of underenforcement is not, of course, to
advocate full enforcement. Nor is it a prescription for any particular level
or form of enforcement practice per se. Rather, it is a call for attentiveness
to the phenomenon itself, its central role in shaping the criminal system,
and the ways that underenforcement replicates and strengthens existing
social inequalities. In particular, it calls for recognition that the state's
inaction with respect to the criminal law can be as profound and destructive
as its overly harsh applications.
CONCLUSION

Our criminal system is rife with inegalitarian enforcement failurespervasive, yet little-noticed ways that the state predictably abandons its
constituents by failing to enforce the rules. In underenforcement "zones,"
social life vacillates between lawfulness and lawlessness: While some
aspects of the law are enforced, others are not; some victims are protected
while others are not. This is the lawlessness of the frontier and of fledgling
democracies that makes people insecure and distrustful of government. It is
the sort of localized unpredictability that implicates many of the same ruleof-law concerns associated with transitional justice, 289 states of
emergency, 290 and other extraordinary circumstances where the law fails to
operate in a coherent, rule-bound fashion. And yet it exists openly in welllit places throughout American society.
Underenforcement casts a long shadow over the viability and legitimacy
of our criminal system. Like overenforcement, rampant underenforcement
makes the rule of law into a democratic luxury; it renders full, fair, and
balanced law enforcement an experience limited to those who can bend the
government to their will.
To address this democratic deficit,
underenforcement should be better recognized as a potentially destructive
phenomenon in its own right. In recognition of the linkages between overand underenforcement, underenforcement needs to be approached
qualitatively, as a call not for harsher but for more responsive policing.
Structural and doctrinal criticisms of our criminal system should better
account for the role of underenforcement in eroding the system's efficacy,

288. See supra Part IV.A.
289. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary
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Inequality, supra note 29, at 206, 213-23 (describing soaring crime rates in post-Cold War
Eastern European countries and correlating it with political dislocation and weakened public
confidence in the state).
290. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be
Constitutional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1023 (2003) (arguing that traditional constitutional rule
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fairness, and democratic accountability. Perhaps most importantly, it
demands that we attend more carefully to the experiences of the system's
many clients, including the vulnerable and the disadvantaged, who, while
sometimes criminals themselves, remain entitled to the protections of the
law.

